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In this Article, the author asserts that after the Civil War, when the race and
gender hierarchies that ordered American society were vulnerable, a little-studied
collection of activist women lawyers led a law reform movement that established
women’s rights incrementally.  They were among those thinking about and experi-
menting with different ways of framing, securing, and enforcing women’s full and
equal citizenship rights.  Their dual status as lawyers and women shaped their goals
and strategies.  As lawyers and licensed members of the legal profession, they oper-
ated within the conventional institutions of power—lobbying the legislatures to enact
new laws and urging judges to implement a new form of legal reasoning that sup-
ported their claims.  As disenfranchised women, they operated within nongovernmen-
tal women’s associations—gathering support for their law reform campaigns and
using their social capital to pressure governmental institutions to grant women
rights.  The author argues that these nineteenth-century law reform campaigns laid
the foundation for the campaigns of the twentieth-century women’s rights movement
that incrementally transformed the legal status of women in America from a position
of subordinate inequality to a formal equality, but have not been effective in securing
women’s substantive equality.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581 R
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE WOMEN’S LAW REFORM MOVEMENT . . . . . 590 R
A. Married Women’s Property Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590 R
B. Woman Suffrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598 R
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WOMEN’S LAW REFORM
MOVEMENT:  WOMEN LAWYERS AND THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR A
NEW JURISPRUDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600 R
* Ph.D., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University, former J. Willard
Hurst Legal History Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School.  The author wishes to
thank Arthur McEvoy, Jane Larson, Eric Arnesen, Susan Levine, Katrin Schultheiss, Felice
Batlan, Barbara Babcock, Barbara Welke, Dan Hamilton, Elizabeth Mertz, Stuart Macaulay,
Mitra Sharfi, Laura Singleton, Risa L. Lieberwitz, Marianne Constable, Rima Schultz, the
Honorable Joan Humphrey Lefkow, the Honorable Elaine Bucklo, the participants of the
University of Wisconsin Socio-Legal Studies Brownbag, the UW Institute for Legal Studies
Fellows Colloquium, the Chicago Bar Association Alliance for Women, and the comments
of a number of anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of this Article.
580
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ303.txt unknown Seq: 2 13-OCT-09 11:53
Spring 2009] AGENTS OF CHANGE 581
A. Myra Bradwell’s Case and the Gendered Origins of
Sociological Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603 R
B. Developing Networks to Advance Women’s Law Reforms . . 612 R
III. WOMEN LAWYERS AND NGOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622 R
A. Women Lawyers’ Networks and Women’s Associations . . . . 622 R
B. Women Lawyers and the World’s Columbian Exposition . . 625 R
IV. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LEGACY OF THE WOMEN’S LAW
REFORM MOVEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 630 R
A. Legacy of Positive Law and Judicial Interpretation
Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631 R
B. Legacy of Women Lawyers Professional Advancement
Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637 R
C. Legacy of Campaigns through NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643 R
INTRODUCTION
“I’ve been an agent of change . . . [for thirty-five years] . . . I [have] worked to help
make the case for [many specific law reforms].”1
“[P]roducing positive change[,] [t]ranslating those words into action is something
that is the . . . slow, hard, boring of hard boards in politics . . . .”2
“I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobil-
ized around big changes—not incremental changes, not small changes.”3
Former Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (and now Secretary of State) and
her 2008 presidential campaign embodied the legacy of the American women’s
rights movement.  For almost two centuries, women’s rights activists employed
a strategy of law reform campaigns to secure incremental rights, and ultimately,
substantive equality for women.  These efforts were primarily responsible for
the transformation of women’s social and legal position in American society.
Law reforms transformed women from feme sole and feme covert to citizen in
the nineteenth century, secured the vote for women in the twentieth century,
and made possible Senator Clinton’s powerful presidential campaign in the
twenty-first century.  Clinton acknowledged that despite these progressions,
“the journey [isn’t] over”; substantive gender inequalities remain.4  As a lawyer
and politician, she pledged to “overcome [the] barriers and obstacles” that per-
sist through a continued application of the law reform strategy.5
1 See Senator Hillary Clinton, Former Senator John Edwards, Senator Barack Obama, Gov-
ernor Bill Richardson, Democratic Presidential Debate at Saint Anselm College (Jan. 5,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/us/politics/05text-dde-
bate.html?pagewanted=all) [hereinafter The Democratic Primary Debate in New Hampshire]
(statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton).
2 Meet the Press: Hillary Clinton (NBC television broadcast Jan. 13, 2008).
3 The Democratic Primary Debate in New Hampshire, supra note 1 (statement of Sen.
Barack Obama).
4 Meet the Press:  Hillary Clinton, supra note 2.
5 Id.  Secretary Clinton continues to advocate for law reforms to advance women’s rights
including:  the Paycheck Fairness Act to address the pay disparities between men and
women, see Senator Clinton Reintroduces Bill Aimed at Ending Pay Gap, HR.BLR.COM
(Mar. 7, 2007), http://hr.blr.com/news.aspx?id=75529, the Prevention First Act to expand
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In contrast, in running against Senator Clinton for the Democratic presi-
dential nomination, then Senator Barack Obama challenged the continued use
of the incremental change strategy.  Obama suggested that now was time for a
more effective approach, one that would secure root change.6  He argued that
despite the political courage of past activists or the import of the legislative
victories, “[W]e never built the majority and coalesced the American people
around being able to get the other stuff done,” to achieve real equality for all
Americans.7  Senator Obama is not the first to argue for a new strategy.  Over
the past two centuries radical feminists and others have advocated for a funda-
mental restructuring of society and its institutions,8 but despite these calls and
the shortcomings of the past campaigns, the law reform strategy remains the
primary tool of the women’s rights movement.9  This Article goes back to the
beginnings.  It examines the origins and development of the law reform strat-
egy of the women’s rights movement to inform the continuing debate on the
most effective means to secure substantive equality for all people in American
society.
Women’s rights activists began drafting and advocating law reforms that
would grant women specific rights in the early nineteenth century as a means to
achieve women’s emancipation and equality.10  They used natural law, the
family planning services to low-income women, see Glass Booth Election 2008, Hillary
Clinton on Abortion and Birth Control, http://glassbooth.org/explore/index/hillary-clinton/1/
abortion-and-birth-control/16/ (last visited June 20, 2009),  and the Prevention First Act,
Open Congress, S.21:  Prevention First Act, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s21/show
(last visited June 20, 2009).
6 See The Democratic Primary Debate in New Hampshire, supra note 1 (statement of Sen.
Barack Obama).
7 Id.
8 See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX:  THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLU-
TION (1970), for a history of radical feminism in the United States to 1970 and an argument
for a feminist revolution. See also GEORGE SAND, To Members of the Central Committee of
the Left, in GEORGE SAND:  IN HER OWN WORDS 410, 411 (Joseph Barry trans., ed., 1979);
Lori D. Ginzberg, “The Hearts of Your Readers will Shudder”:  Fanny Wright, Infidelity,
and American Freethought, 46 AM. Q. 195 (1994) (describing the radical positions of Amer-
ican feminist Frances Wright).  See also MARGARET H. MCFADDEN, GOLDEN CABLES OF
SYMPATHY:  THE TRANSATLANTIC SOURCES OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY FEMINISM 80 (1999),
for a non-American, feminist call for a radical change.  Sand, a French author, argued in
1848 that there must be a radical transformation in society before women could be an effec-
tive political force. Id.
9 See National Organization of Women, Take Action!, http://www.now.org/actions (last vis-
ited June 20, 2009) (listing NOW’s agenda which is heavily weighted toward legislative
action); see also Equal Rights Advocates, About ERA, http://www.equalrights.org/about/
about_era.asp (last visited June 20, 2009) (“Since 1974, [its] mission has been to protect and
secure equal rights and economic opportunities for women and girls through litigation and
advocacy.”); Feminist Majority, http://feministmajority.org (last visited June 20, 2009) (stat-
ing its motto “Working for Women’s Equality from the Streets to the Legislature”).
10 See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, The Limitations of Sisterhood:  Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Division in the American Suffrage Movement, 1875-1902, in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND
WOMEN’S  RIGHTS 160, 160-61 (1998) [hereinafter DUBOIS, The Limitations of Sisterhood];
see also NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 16-17 (1987); ELLEN
CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE:  THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, at 40 (1978) [hereinafter DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE].
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Declaration of Independence, and the principles of classical liberalism as the
authority for their law reform campaigns and to shape their conceptions of lib-
erty and equality.11  They conceived of liberty as the notion that woman, like
man, should be free to pursue her “own true and substantial happiness.”12
They conceived of equality in terms of human rights and argued that woman,
like man, had the right to pursue whatever “station in society as her conscience
shall dictate.”13  Thus, the early women’s rights activists did not assert that
women were either the same as men or different than men but rather, that men
and women were equally human beings and therefore equally entitled to all
human rights and responsibilities.
To actualize their conception of equality, what I will call “substantive
equality,” women’s rights activists developed a law reform strategy to secure
women’s legal equality.  They believed if they were able to enact positive laws
that fundamentally changed women’s legal position from subordinate to equal,
women’s substantive equality would necessarily follow.14  They reasoned that
if women were no longer subordinate under the law, the institutions of govern-
ance, which were created on the premise of women’s subordination, would
have to transform, structurally and operationally, to reflect and protect
women’s equality.15  These transformations would then restructure American
society with a new foundation based on real liberty and substantive equality for
all.16  Over the last quarter century some scholars and activists have challenged
this notion that legal equality will bring substantive equality.17  The women’s
11 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER:  SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 12-
13 (1989); see also COTT, supra note 10, at 16-17; KATHLEEN S. SULLIVAN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONTEXT:  WOMEN AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 6,
84-89 (2007) (arguing that as the early women’s rights activists invoked classic liberalism in
order to abolish coverture, they reshaped it).  Sullivan argues further that their “version of
liberalism became the definitive of American liberalism.” Id. at 6.
12 Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, Seneca Falls, in FEMINISM:  THE ESSENTIAL
HISTORICAL WRITINGS 76, 80 (Miriam Schneir ed., Vintage Books ed. 1994) (1972) [herein-
after Declaration].
13 Id. at 81.
14 See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT:  WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 175-77 (1998) (describing the feminist
ideology that laws securing women’s legal equality in marriage would restore a wife’s self
sovereignty, as well as grant her property rights); SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 14 (arguing
that feminists advocated for married women’s property acts as a means to dismantle
coverture).
15 See SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 2; see also ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, The Radicalism of
the Woman Suffrage Movement:  Notes toward the Reconstruction of Nineteenth-Century
Feminism, in WOMAN SUFFRAGE and Women’s Rights, supra note 10, at 30, 30-31.
16 See SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 5-6.
17 See Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for
Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 211 (1998); Linda Hirshman, Fore-
word: The Waning of the Middle Ages, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 294, 296 (1993) (arguing
although the American legal system employed the principles of liberalism to overturn medie-
val systems, medieval practices survived in the liberal regime); Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status- Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); see also Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble:  Sameness and
Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1925 (2000) (arguing that laws
that establish formal racial equality do not result in racial justice).
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rights movement, nonetheless, continues to employ the law reform strategy as
its primary tool.18
The initial law reform campaigns that served as the foundation of the
women’s rights movement were aimed at abolishing the common law principle
of coverture.19  This doctrine tied women’s legal status to her marital or kin
relationships and rendered a married woman civilly dead.20  Therefore, these
early campaigns focused on enacting laws that granted married women the civil
rights to own and control their separate property and to have equal guardianship
rights to their children.21  They also advocated for laws that would grant all
women the right to pursue an education, work in their chosen occupation, and
vote.22  Finally, they advocated for the abolition of slavery, to secure liberty for
all people.23  Although their initial campaigns were not effective in enacting
these legal changes, in the decades before the Civil War, their efforts laid the
foundation for the law reform strategy to become a primary tool of the
women’s rights movement.
After the Civil War and the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment that
deemed all men and women born or naturalized in the United States to be
citizens, women’s rights activists argued that the Amendment meant women
were fully enfranchised.24  They developed a strategy called the “new depar-
ture” that asserted there was no further need for law reforms to secure women’s
18 See supra note 9.
19 See infra note 20.
20 The ideal underlying coverture was that the husband became the wife’s protector, cover-
ing her completely in most legal aspects.  In return, the wife was required to be subservient
to the husband and to take his name.  The creation of this legal union prohibited spouses
from contracting with each other or testifying in court in matters regarding the other.  Since
the husband was the sole embodiment of the union, the wife could not enter into a contract,
sue or be sued, or execute a will.  Upon marriage, a woman lost all of her personal property,
including her wages, the control of her real property and all the proceeds from her land to her
husband.  Under the principle of curtesy, if the marriage produced a child, the husband main-
tained a life interest in the wife’s real estate after her death.  Further, under coverture, the
husband could deprive a wife of guardianship of their children. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE
EYES OF THE LAW:  WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW
YORK 17-19, 20-24 (1982); see also SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, “BELONGING TO THE
WORLD”:  WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 108-10 (2001);
Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts, J. WOMEN’S HIST.,
Spring 1994, at 9, 10; Linda E. Speth, The Married Women’s Property Acts, 1839-1865:
Reform, Reactions, or Revolution?, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW:  A SOCIAL HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, 69, 69-70 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982).
21 See STANLEY, supra note 14, at 199-217 (arguing that women’s rights activists argued for
property rights on the basis of contract law).  They argued that women were equal partners to
the marriage contract and therefore needed laws that granted them ownership and control
over their bodies, labor, and wages. Id. See also NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:  A HIS-
TORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 52-55 (2000); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN
AMERICA:  A HISTORY (2000).
22 See Alison M. Parker, The Case for Reform Antecedents for the Woman’s Rights Move-
ment, in VOTES FOR WOMEN:  THE STRUGGLE FOR SUFFRAGE REVISITED, 21, 21-23 (Jean H.
Baker ed., 2002).
23 Id. at 23. See also DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 21-40.
24 See Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Bradwell, Minor, and
Suffrage Militance in the 1870s, in VISIBLE WOMEN:  NEW ESSAYS ON AMERICAN ACTIVISM
19, 21 (Nancy A. Hewitt & Suzanne Lebsock eds., 1993).
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equality, and they claimed, specifically, that women had full suffrage rights.25
A number of activists across the country went to the polls and demanded they
be allowed to vote.26  Most local and state officials, however, refused to com-
ply.27  When the United States Supreme Court ruled in the 1870s that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not establish or protect women’s right to vote or work,
women’s rights activists began to divide into overlapping but distinct
factions.28
The factions split over a number of issues including reform priorities,
strategies, and sometimes over whether and how the biological and gender dif-
ferences between women and men should shape the law and the content of
equality, but each continued to use law reform campaigns as one of their pri-
mary strategies.  White woman suffragists, who comprised the most widely-
studied faction of the women’s rights movement, increasingly narrowed their
law reform campaigns to the singular aim of securing the vote but divided
amongst themselves over issues of race and gender ideology.29  Women tem-
perance activists grounded their activism in a separate spheres ideology that
rested on women’s status (rather than a liberal ideology rested on women’s
equality) and employed law reform campaigns to advance their efforts to pro-
tect women and children from physical and sexual abuse.30  Women race activ-
25 See 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 407-520 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B.
Anthony, & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881).
26 See DuBois, supra note 24, at 23-26.
27 Id. at 25.
28 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (holding that the right to
vote was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (holding that the right to work was not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Norma Basch, Reconstructing Female Citizenship: Minor v. Happer-
sett, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE:  CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 52, 54-55 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992).  See also DUBOIS,
FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 162-202 (describing the first split in the
women’s rights movement, which occurred in 1869, over whether to support the Fifteenth
Amendment that granted suffrage to African American men, but not to women).  Susan B.
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton led the dissenting faction and established an indepen-
dent woman suffrage movement. Id.
29 See RHODE, supra note 11, at 14 (arguing that “many nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century feminists muted the rhetoric of natural rights in favor of the rhetoric of natural roles”
and emphasized women’s moral superiority as grounds for the vote); DuBois, supra note 24,
at 34 (describing how the separate suffrage faction narrowed its efforts to the singular goal
of securing woman suffrage in the years after the Minor decision and how this allowed elitist
and racist tendencies to spread within the movement); see also DUBOIS, The Limitations of
Sisterhood, supra note 10, at 161 (describing the divisions of the suffrage movement in the
late nineteenth century over issues of religion, sex, and family); DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 9 (describing how the prevailing view of woman suffragists
separated their campaigns for the vote from other women’s rights issues).
30 See RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND LIBERTY,
1873-1900 3, 55 (1990) (arguing that women took over the temperance cause in the 1870s
and characterized it as “a maternal struggle”).  Bordin argues that by the end of the decade
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union began to employ law reforms to further its cause
of protecting women, children, and the sanctity of the home. Id. at 55. See Jane E. Larson,
“Even a Worm Will Turn at Last”:  Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9
YALE J.L. &  HUMAN. 1, 3 (1997) (arguing that the Women’s Christian Temperance Union
campaigns to raise the age of sexual consent should be understood as rape law reform cam-
paigns).  For a discussion of the separate spheres ideology, see generally NANCY F. COTT,
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ists advocated law reforms aimed at abolishing race discriminations and
inequities for both African American men and women.31  Women labor activ-
ists advocated for law reforms that would establish health and safety standards
for factories, a minimum wage, maximum hour restrictions, protection for girls
and women from workplace sexual abuses, and the right to organize.32  There
were many activists who were members of more than one faction and fought
for multiple law reforms.33  But there was only a small collection of little-
studied law activists who maintained the early movement’s strategy of pursuing
a wide range of law reforms with the broad aim of securing women’s equality
before the law.34
Women lawyers, with the assistance of a number of Radical Republican
male lawyers, were the primary leaders of the law activist faction.35  They
insisted that women were full citizens, privileged the law and law reforms as
their main strategy, and demanded rights that would secure women’s substan-
tive equality.36  The law activists pursued law reforms to secure women’s citi-
zenship rights from two positions:  within the existing governmental
THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD:  “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1730-1835 (1977);
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and Ritual:  Relations between Women
in Nineteenth-Century America, 1 SIGNS 1 (1975); Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Woman-
hood:  1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966). But see Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres,
Female Worlds, Woman’s Place:  The Rhetoric of Women’s History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 9-13
(1988) (arguing that the practice of dividing the women’s rights movement into two camps,
those who privileged women’s status (difference) and those who privileged women’s equal-
ity (sameness), renders a false dichotomy, obscuring the fluidity of those positions and the
diversity of approaches within the feminist movement).
31 See CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE:  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS (Alfreda M. Duster
ed., 1970) (describing the law reform campaigns of Wells, including anti-lynching and
woman suffrage, and the racial discriminations she faced); JANE RHODES, MARY ANN SHADD
CARY:  THE BLACK PRESS AND PROTEST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 185-211 (1998)
(describing Cary’s legal education, her law reform efforts on behalf of both women and
African Americans, and the race divisions she encountered); PATRICIA A. SCHECHTER, IDA
B. WELLS-BARNETT AND AMERICAN REFORM, 1880-1930 (2001); Margaret Walker, Fore-
word, in DOROTHY STERLING, BLACK FOREMOTHERS:  THREE LIVES, at vii, xi (2d ed. 1988)
(arguing that black and white women within the women’s rights movement divided over
issues of race).
32 See MEREDITH TAX, THE RISING OF THE WOMEN:  FEMINIST SOLIDARITY AND CLASS
CONFLICT, 1880-1917, at 45, 65-89 (1980) (describing the efforts of the Working Women’s
Union in the 1870s to organize women workers and its campaign for the eight-hour day law).
Tax also describes the campaigns of the Illinois Woman’s Alliance in the 1880s for compul-
sory education laws and the enforcement of factory inspection laws. Id.  For a discussion of
women’s gender discrimination within the labor movement in the nineteenth century before
the Progressive Era, see generally ILEEN A. DEVAULT, UNITED APART:  GENDER AND THE
RISE OF CRAFT UNIONISM (2004). See also SUSAN LEVINE, LABOR’S TRUE WOMAN:  CAR-
PET WEAVERS, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND LABOR REFORM IN THE GILDED AGE (1984).
33 See e.g., BORDIN, supra note 30, at 6-61 (describing Frances Willard’s activism for tem-
perance and later woman suffrage); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE
NATION’S WORK:  THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900, at 216-22, 303
(1995) (describing Florence Kelley’s activism for labor reform and woman suffrage); see
also CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 81-86, 345-47(describing Ida B. Wells’ race
activism and woman suffrage).
34 See infra Part II.
35 See infra Part II.
36 See infra Part II.
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institutions and within the emerging nongovernmental women’s associations.37
As lawyers, insiders within the conventional institutions of power, they pressed
rights claims and developed a new form of legal reasoning to advance their
arguments.38  Being disenfranchised, the women developed law reform agen-
das within nongovernmental women’s associations that then pressured govern-
mental institutions to grant women rights.39
The story of the law activists is unfamiliar because of the pervasive ten-
dency to conflate the suffrage movement and the women’s rights movement
and because of the dearth of information on the reform activities of nineteenth-
century women lawyers.40  Most of the literature on nineteenth and early twen-
tieth-century women lawyers focuses on their efforts to win the right to be
lawyers and their struggles and movements to work as practicing attorneys.41
While scholars have long acknowledged that many of the early women lawyers
were suffragists, temperance workers, race activists, and labor activists, only
recently do works suggest that they may have played a unique role in the larger
women’s right movement.42  I argue that the activities of the nineteenth-century
activist women lawyers were part of a conscious and deliberate women’s law
reform movement and that their law reform campaigns laid the foundation for
the twentieth-century women’s rights claims that incrementally transformed the
legal status of women in American society into a position of formal, but not
substantive, equality.
37 See infra Part II.
38 See infra Part II.
39 See infra Part II.
40 See Rebecca Edwards, Not For Ourselves Alone:  The Story of Elizabeth Cady Stanton
and Susan B. Anthony, J. FOR MULTIMEDIA HIST.  (2000) (video review), http://
www.albany.edu/jmmh/vol3/ourselves_alone/ourselves-alone.html.
41 See generally RONALD CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS:  WOMEN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING
AMERICA (1985); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (2d ed. 1993); HEDDA GARZA,
BARRED FROM THE BAR:  A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996); JOAN
HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE:  A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991); KAREN
BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR:  THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE
PRESENT (1986); Nancy T. Gilliam, A Professional Pioneer:  Myra Bradwell’s Fight to
Practice Law, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 105 (1987); Jill Norgren, Before It Was Merely Difficult:
Belva Lockwood’s Life in Law and Politics, 23 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 16 (1999); D. Kelly
Weisberg, Barred from the Bar:  Women and Legal Education in the United States, 1870-
1890, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1977).
42 See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW:  WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN
HISTORY 9-36 (1998) [hereinafter DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW]; VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN,
WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY IN AMERICA 1-38 (1993)
[hereinafter DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS] ; Felice Batlan, Engendering Legal History, 30
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 843 (2005); see also JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST
WOMAN LAWYER:  THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL (1993); SKLAR, supra note 33, at
248-49; STANLEY, supra note 14, at 201-07 (describing the legislative efforts for women’s
emancipation of Myra Bradwell, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mary Livermore, Frances Gage
and Lucy Stone); VANBURKLEO, supra note 20, at 153-63; Barbara Allen Babcock, Book
Review, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1695-1702 (1998) (reviewing
DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra); Catherine B. Cleary, Lavinia Goodell, First Woman
Lawyer in Wisconsin, 74 WIS. MAG. HIST. 243 (1991); Kenneth Walter Mack, A Social
History of Everyday Practice:  Sadie T.M. Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women
into the American Legal Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405 (2002).
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This Article narrates the story of the law activists, the handful of women
and men lawyers who were among those thinking about and experimenting
with different ways of framing, securing, and enforcing women’s full and equal
citizenship rights.  They chose to operate institutionally and developed a com-
plex, three-prong strategy that they employed primarily through the courts and
the legislatures.  First, they led law reform campaigns that secured incremental
social, civil, and political rights for women through positive laws.  Second, they
infiltrated the legal profession, positioning themselves as insiders within the
legal system, enabling them to better influence the interpretation and enforce-
ment of the positive laws they worked to enact.  Third, they became leaders in
national and international women’s associations helping to translate women’s
social capital into a new form of nongovernmental, political power that they
used to advance law reforms.  The legacy of this movement is manifest in the
work of twenty-first-century women’s rights activists, including Hillary Clin-
ton, who continue to employ these strategies in their persistent aim for true
equality.
Part I begins with the development of the American women’s rights move-
ment in the early nineteenth century.  It argues that in the decades before and
after the Civil War, the movement advocated for married women’s property
acts (MWPAs) and woman suffrage as specific law reforms intended to grant
women important incremental rights that would aid in their goal of securing
women’s equality.  Woman suffrage was not originally perceived as the key to
women’s emancipation, but as one of many rights and privileges that women,
as citizens, should possess.43  Part I further argues that though male legislatures
did not enact MWPAs in order to grant women rights, the efforts of the
women’s rights activists to secure those acts were important to the development
of the women’s law reform movement.  Finally, this section tells the story of
the emergence of a distinct women’s law reform movement and Myra
Bradwell’s rise as a leader within that movement.44
Part II revisits the story of Myra Bradwell’s fight to attain a law license.45
It argues that Bradwell and her advocates were part of a deliberate and collec-
tive effort of law activists who sought to use the law to secure women’s equal-
43 See VANBURKLEO, supra note 20, at 171; Parker, supra note 22, at 21.
44 Myra Bradwell was an abolitionist, a women’s rights activist, a legal scholar, a journalist,
and a businesswoman.  She founded, edited, and published the Chicago Legal News, a
weekly legal newspaper, from 1868 until her death in 1894.  In her paper and through her
organizational activities, Bradwell advocated for a wide range of law reforms, including,
especially, law reforms that would secure women’s full citizenship rights, privileges, and
obligations.  For biographical assessments of Bradwell, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 42; Caro-
line K. Goddard, Bradwell, Myra Colby, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO 1790-1990:  A BIO-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 112, 112-14 (Rima Lunin Schultz et al. eds., 2001); Dorothy
Thomas, Bradwell, Myra Colby, in 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN 1607-1950:  A BIO-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 223-25 (Edward T. James et al. eds., 1971).
45 For accounts of Bradwell’s case, see DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 19-
25; FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 17-33; GARZA, supra note 41, at 32-39; HERMAN KOGAN,
THE FIRST CENTURY:  THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, 1874-1974, at 24-29 (1974);
MORELLO, supra note 41, at 13-21; Herman Kogan, Myra Bradwell:  Crusader at Law, 3
CHI. HIST. 132 (1974); Gilliam, supra note 41; Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to
False Equality:  Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1518 (1986).
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ity when the race and gender hierarchies that had ordered American society,
from its founding, were vulnerable.  The debates and uncertainty over how to
reconstruct the nation after the Civil War, and which principles would serve as
foundations, created space for the law activists to advocate their visions of lib-
erty and equality.  The simultaneous transformation within the legal profession
of the dominant understanding of the nature and philosophy of law, and the
debates over which methods of judicial interpretation should be employed, cre-
ated the opportunity for the law activists to espouse new jurisprudential argu-
ments.  I posit that these arguments were an early manifestation of what later
became known as sociological jurisprudence.46
Part III depicts how activist women lawyers operated within nongovern-
mental women’s associations to advance their law reform movement.  The
associations employ the model of transnational advocacy networks, analyzed
by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink.47  The networks illustrate how
actors with shared common values and aims exchanged information and exper-
iences, using their collective knowledge strategically to “persuade, pressure,
and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments.”48
Activist women lawyers formed both their own organizations and committees
within larger women’s associations, in order to exchange information and
experiences regarding the unequal status of women.  They used their collective
knowledge to broaden their law reform campaigns and to mobilize greater
numbers of women to support these campaigns.  They then used their amplified
voices to influence the dominant legal and political systems to advance
women’s rights. This section particularly examines what I posit was the women
lawyers’ first major invocation of their transnational advocacy networks at the
1893 World’s Columbian Exposition.49  I argue that these efforts were one of
the historical precursors to the political activism of twentieth-century nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs).
Part IV illustrates how the nineteenth-century women’s law reform strate-
gies for legal equality resonated in the strategies of twentieth and twenty-first-
century law activists.  It argues that although the law reform movement did
make significant strides in securing women’s formal legal equality, it fell short
of its goal to achieve substantive equality for women.  The strategy of law
reform, which works within the existing structures of society, has not yet
spawned a restructuring of the institutions of governance.  Rather, it has left in
place the institutions and traditions that formed the foundation of women’s ine-
46 See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 191-97 (1998).
47 See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:  ADVO-
CACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1-37 (1998).
48 Id. at 2.
49 The 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition, the second major international fair held in the
United States, was intended to commemorate Columbus’s arrival in the “new world.”  Chi-
cago won a rigorous competition to host the exposition.  Contemporary observers estimated
that twenty-seven million people attended the fair, half of them coming from other countries.
See DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE CENTURY:  THE EPIC OF CHICAGO AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA 378-80, 488 (1997).
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quality.50  It has also failed to address the acts of discrimination and circum-
stances of inequality that exist beyond the reach of the law.51  This Article
concludes with an assessment that this history of the law reform campaigns of
the women’s rights movement may suggest that activists will only achieve sub-
stantive equality if they develop an alternate, radical strategy to abolish the
status regime.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE WOMEN’S LAW REFORM MOVEMENT
Before states allowed women to be licensed lawyers, women learned in
the law began to organize and engage in efforts to change the law to establish
women as autonomous citizens.52  These early women’s rights activists, prima-
rily white women of some privilege, joined with abolitionist men who believed
that the principles of liberty and equality should apply to men and women of all
races.53  Their first efforts focused on abolishing the enforcement of the com-
mon law principle of coverture.54  They compared coverture to slavery and
demanded women’s emancipation with full citizenship rights, including the
right of married women to own property and the right to vote for all women.55
After the Civil War, a handful of these activists determined to become law-
yers.56  They sought to use their position inside the profession to directly influ-
ence the development of positive law, the way the law was interpreted, and the
application of law.
A. Married Women’s Property Acts
By 1860 a national law reform movement advocated the enactment of
married women’s property rights.  The trend began in the 1830s when the legis-
latures in the Arkansas Territory (1835) and the state of Mississippi (1839)
each passed a law allowing a married woman to maintain property separate
from her husband.57  Two decades later, twenty of the states admitted to the
Union (sixty-one percent) had laws establishing separate estates for married
women.58  Historians and legal scholars diversely interpret the motivations and
effects of the acts, but they generally agree that the principal motivations were
men’s economic concerns—not women’s rights.59  Women’s rights activists
50 See SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 10-11; Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal,
and Hartz:  The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549 (1993)
(explaining that throughout American political history, liberal reforms co-exist with, rather
than replace, America’s illiberal traditions).
51 Harris, supra note 17, at 1927-28 (arguing that anti-discrimination laws fail to eliminate
racism and its practices).
52 See STANLEY, supra note 14, at 201-07; see also COTT, supra note 10, at 16-17.
53 See supra note 21.
54 See supra note 20.
55 BASCH, supra note 20, at 118; STANLEY, supra note 14, at 175-76.
56 See infra note 164.
57 See SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 69; Michael B. Dougan, The Arkansas Married
Woman’s Property Law, 46 ARK. HIST. Q. 3 (1987).
58 See HOFF, supra note 41, at 127-35, 377-82; see also Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the
Married Women’s Property Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 11 (1994).
59 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 208-11 (2d ed. 1985)
(arguing reformers’ desire to provide relief to debtors in order to foster economic growth
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were, nonetheless, involved in campaigns for such acts.60  Although their
efforts may not have been the primary reason for the acts’ passage, their vision
and strategies were critical to the development of a women’s law reform
movement.
The first law reform campaigns that advocated for married women’s prop-
erty laws as a women’s rights issue began in the northeast in the 1830s.  A
loose coalition of activist women and radical men drafted bills, lobbied state
legislatures, and spoke publicly in support of the acts.61  Assemblyman Thomas
Herttell, a leader in the movement, introduced one of the first of these bills to
the New York Legislature in 1837.62  He argued that under the guarantees of
the United States Constitution, the state of New York must restore to married
women their natural right to “life, liberty, and property.”63  Although this bill
failed, over the next decade men and women activists, throughout the United
States and across the Atlantic, increasingly agitated for women’s rights—and
married women’s property rights in particular—on the principle of equality.64
was the primary motivation for the acts); see also BASCH, supra 20, at 123-25; PEGGY A.
RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS:  THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE EMANCIPATION
106-07 (1980); SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 21-44 (arguing the acts were part of the larger
codification movement); Shammas, supra note 58, at 11, 24 (arguing the motivations for the
acts included a desire to stabilize the volatile economy of the 1830s that had spurred a rise in
bankruptcies; a desire to shield the wife’s pre-marital property; especially patrimony, from a
husband’s creditors; and a desire to ameliorate the escalating litigation in the chancery courts
regarding women’s separate estates).
The relationship between women’s rights activists and the MWPA has generated the
greatest debate among scholars.  For studies that argue the pre-1850 statutes were passed
without the influence of any organized women’s rights agitation, see FRIEDMAN, supra note
42, at 210; KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR:  LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 158 (1989).
See generally RABKIN, supra, at 106-107 (arguing the New York acts actually motivated the
women’s rights movement, rather than the other way around); Megan Benson, Fisher v.
Allen:  The Southern Origins of the Married Women’s Property Acts, 6 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 97
(1998).
60 See infra notes 61-65.
61 See BASCH, supra note 20, at 119-20 (arguing in the 1830s, a handful of activists joined
the fight and publicly spoke out for women’s rights. These included Sarah Grimke, Ernestine
Rose, and Thomas Herttell, all of whom argued for women’s equality, and Sarah Hale, who
argued for women’s rights based on women’s moral superiority); Ginzberg, supra note 8, at
200-01 (arguing in the 1820s, many of the men and women characterized as freethinkers,
especially Fanny Wright and Robert Owen, advocated for women’s citizenship rights);.
62 See BASCH, supra note 20, at 115.
63 See Judge Thomas Herttell, Remarks on the Bill to Restore to Married Women “The
Right of Property,” as Guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States (1837), available
at http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/book-sum/herttell3.html; see also YURI SUHL, ERNESTINE
L. ROSE:  WOMEN’S RIGHTS PIONEER (2d ed. 1990).
64 See LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND THE CONDITION OF WOMAN (1838)
(comprised of fifteen letters Sarah M. Grimke´ wrote to Mary S. Parker, President of the
Boston Female anti-Slavery Society advocating rights for women).  The letters are repub-
lished in THE PUBLIC YEARS OF SARAH AND ANGELINA GRIMK ´E:  SELECTED WRITINGS 1835-
1839 (Larry Ceplair ed., 1989). See also BASCH, supra note 20, at 117-20; E. P. HURLBUT,
ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR POLITICAL GUARANTIES 144-72 (1845) (arguing for
women’s rights as human rights); MCFADDEN, supra note 8, at 20; RABKIN, supra note 59, at
106-07; MARION KIRKLAND REID, A PLEA FOR WOMEN (1843) (arguing for women’s right to
financial independence and suffrage in Great Britain. The book was also popular in America,
with five editions published in the U.S. between 1847 and 1852.); 1 THE SELECTED PAPERS
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They also persistently re-introduced married women’s property acts in New
York and a number of other states and territories.65
By the late 1840s, the loose coalition of women’s rights activists began to
formalize.  The leaders organized local, then national, conventions where men
and women dedicated to the liberal principles of liberty and equality congre-
gated to advance women’s rights.  They set their agenda at the first of these
meetings, the Seneca Falls Women’s Rights Convention (1848), invoking the
principles and words articulated in the Declaration of Independence.66  Specifi-
cally, they called for the demise of coverture and the enactment of a number of
positive laws that granted women rights, such as a married woman’s right to
own and control her real and personal property, including her labor and her
wages.67  A handful of states, including New York, had passed married
women’s statutes that granted women limited property rights, but no state pro-
vided the equality that the women’s rights activists sought.68  By 1850, at the
first National Women’s Rights Convention, the activists demanded all states
enact statutory reforms of married women’s property rights.69  They then
developed networks, where experienced advocates traveled state to state to ini-
tiate or enhance local campaigns.70
The Illinois campaign for women’s rights developed out of these mixed-
sex networks of activists.  In 1855, in the small town of Earlville, Illinois, a
local attorney Alonzo Grover delivered an address that sparked the formation
of Illinois’ first woman suffrage organization; Susan Hoxie Richardson, a
cousin of Susan B. Anthony, served as president of the association and
Grover’s wife, Octavia, was elected secretary.71  Grover, whom Stanton and
Anthony described as “an able champion of the constitutional rights of
women,” then published articles supporting women’s rights in the Earville
Transcript to further the cause and expand the network.72  The campaign grew
to include reform-minded male lawyers, like Charles Waite, and women activ-
ists who were studied in the law, including Catharine Van Valkenburg Waite,
OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY:  IN THE SCHOOL OF ANTI-SLAVERY,
1840 TO 1866, at 76 n.4 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997), available at http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/
docs/seneca.html#senf4 [hereinafter SELECTED PAPERS].
65 See BASCH, supra note 20, at 136-38.
66 See Declaration, supra note 12, at 76-81.
67 See id.; SELECTED PAPERS, supra note 64, at 76 n.4.
68 See BASCH, supra note 20, at 137.
69 See Paulina Wright Davis, Opening Address at the 1850 Woman’s Rights Convention at
Worcester, Mass., (Oct. 23, 1850) (available at http://www.wwhp.org/Resources/Womans
Rights/proceedings.html#resolutions%20unanimously%20adopted).
70 See Eugene H. Roseboom, Gage, Frances Dana Barker, in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, supra note 44, at 2, 2-4; Elizabeth B. Warbasse, Cutler, Hanna Maria Conant
Tracy, in 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 44, at 426, 426-27.
71 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 560 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, &
Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1886).
72 Id.  One of these articles was written by Catharine V. Waite. Id. at 561.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ303.txt unknown Seq: 14 13-OCT-09 11:53
Spring 2009] AGENTS OF CHANGE 593
Hannah Tracy Cutler, and Frances Dana Gage.73  In the years before the Civil
War, these activists traveled throughout the state lecturing on women’s rights.74
The early Illinois reformers, like other pre-Civil War women’s rights
activists, centered their activities on changing laws that restricted the civil and
political rights of women.75  They initially advanced their cause by participat-
ing in what Sandra VanBurkleo describes as “republican” speech communi-
ties.76  The communities, comprised predominately of white, educated women
and men, and a few African American men and women, spoke out for women’s
rights, engaged in political activities and civil demonstrations, and called for
law reforms and positive laws to grant women rights.77  Throughout the 1850s
Frances Gage worked within these communities, traveling extensively between
New York and Ohio as well as to Illinois, Missouri, and even Louisiana.78  In
1859, she and Cutler went to New York to assist Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Ernestine Rose, and Susan B. Anthony secure the Earnings Act, an addition to
the New York MWPAs that allowed a married woman to own and control her
wages.79  In 1860, Gage and Cutler initiated a campaign for a MWPA in
Illinois.80
Illinois followed the pattern of New York and other states by passing
MWPAs in stages, granting married women property rights incrementally.  The
first Illinois MWPA became law on April 24, 1861, just over a week after the
battle at Fort Sumter began the Civil War.81  The law granted a married woman
the right to maintain as her sole and separate property, outside of the control or
interference of her husband, all property that she owned at the time of marriage
or acquired during marriage.82  This law, however, left in tact many of the
73 Id.  Cutler and Gage had been leaders in the woman’s rights movement in Ohio until
1852 when Hannah Tracy married Samuel Cutler and moved to Illinois.  See Warbasse,
supra note 70, at 426-27.
74 See 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 71, at 561-62.
75 DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 22-23.
76 VANBURKLEO, supra note 20, at 81.
77 Id. at 93; BASCH, supra note 20, at 175, 181-89 (documenting the speeches of women’s
rights activists and their demands for law reform during the 1850s).  The activists included
Frances Gage, Lucy Stone, Wendell Phillips, Antoinette Brown, Lucretia Mott, Ernestine
Rose, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Amelia Bloomer. Id.  See also
DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 29; Nell Irvin Painter, Voices of Suf-
frage:  Sojourner Truth, Frances Watkins Harper, and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage, in
VOTES FOR WOMEN, supra note 22, at 42, 42-55 (arguing that some African American
women advocated for women’s rights before the Civil War, including most prominently
Sojourner Truth).
78 Frances Gage was an abolitionist and a women’s rights activist. See Roseboom, supra
note 70, at 2-4.
79 Warbasse, supra note 70, at 426-27.
80 See 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 71, at 561-62; Warbasse, supra note
70, at 426-27.
81 1861 Ill. Laws 143. See also 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 71, at 561.
82 See 1861 Ill. Laws 143; 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 71, at 561-62
(explaining how Cutler drafted the bill).  Although an unnamed state legislator had promised
that he would act on this petition, Cutler undertook the task when the legislator failed to act.
Id.  After researching the form and procedure of drafting a bill at the state library, Cutler
authored a bill that gave married women the right to maintain as her sole and separate prop-
erty, outside the control or interference of her husband, all property that she owned at the
time of marriage or acquired during marriage. Id.
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restrictions of coverture that maintained married women’s financial dependence
as well as the underlying status regime of the common law.83  The law activ-
ists, nonetheless, viewed it as a start in their movement.84  They immediately
began to advocate for other broad and specific legislation for women’s rights,
including granting women equal guardianship rights to their children.85  But the
Civil War intensified, suppressing many of their efforts until after the war.86
For the next four years, northern activists focused much of their energy on
supporting the Union Army, unwittingly developing critical social and political
skills that enhanced the women’s rights movement after the War.87  They
joined local Sanitary Commissions, established to assist the Union Army in
maintaining hygienic field hospitals and camps societies, held fundraisers for
the war effort, and formed charitable organizations that provided direct services
to the troops.88  Myra Bradwell, an abolitionist and emerging women’s rights
activist, was president of the Soldiers’ Aid Society, one of the organizations
that provided medical services and supplies to wounded soldiers and relief to
their families.89  Commission work taught Bradwell and the other volunteers
how to develop and operate large advocacy organizations.90  After the war,
many women who had worked in the Sanitary Commissions and other organi-
zations, as well as women who had worked during the war in the factories, on
farms, in business offices as clerks, or as teachers in the grammar and normal
schools believed they had fulfilled their citizenship duties and that their efforts
entitled them to full civil and political citizenship rights.91  With the passage of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and ultimately the Fifteenth Amendments, these
women activists demanded that the promises embedded in these laws—to
endow freed men with citizenship rights—also granted white, black, and freed
women those same rights.92
83 See Talk with the Legislature, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172 ; Husband and
Wife–Property of Latter under Law of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1868, at 22 (speci-
fying the inequalities that persisted in the Illinois property laws).
84 See 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 71, at 561-62.
85 Id. at 562 (explaining Cutler also proposed a bill that granted a widow, with an estate
valued at $5000 or less, the right to maintain her husband’s property after his death).  This
was intended to assist women whose husbands died in battle by allowing them to continue to
operate the family estate to care for themselves and their children. Id.
86 Cf. Faye Dudden, New York Strategy:  The New York Woman’s Movement and the Civil
War, in VOTES FOR WOMEN, supra note 22, at 56, 56 (arguing that women’s rights activism
in New York continued during the Civil War).
87 See ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE:  THE WOMAN’S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 101-02 (enlarged ed. 1996).
88 See MARY A. LIVERMORE, MY STORY OF THE WAR:  A WOMAN’S NARRATIVE OF FOUR
YEARS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 411-56, 455 (1887); BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF
CHICAGO VOLUME II:  FROM TOWN TO CITY 1848-1871, at 453, 455 (1940).
89 See FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 87, at 100-01; Thomas, supra note 44, at 223-
24.
90 See STEVEN M. BUECHLER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVE-
MENT:  THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, 1850-1920, at 59 (1986).
91 See FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 87, at 136-37; see also BUECHLER, supra note
90, at 59; DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 181.
92 See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:  CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 285 (1997); see also FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 87, at 136-37.
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Myra Bradwell understood the potential power of the Reconstruction
Amendments for women’s rights.93  The Amendments provided new constitu-
tional grounds to bolster activists’ natural law arguments for women’s equal-
ity.94  Bradwell was well trained in the law.  She began studying law in the
Chicago office of her husband and brother in 1854.95  After the War, in 1868,
she founded and edited the Chicago Legal News (CLN), a weekly legal news-
paper for lawyers and judges, which she used to champion women’s rights.96
In her paper, she argued that the Constitution now secured women’s substantive
equality:  “[U]nder the [Thirteenth and Fourteenth] [A]mendments to the con-
stitution of the United States and the ‘Civil Rights Bill,’ [a woman] stands
equal before the law in respect to her civil rights, with the most favored citizen
of the state male or female.”97  To secure and enforce this equality, Bradwell
used the CLN to continue the law reform strategy activists began before the
War.
The CLN differed from Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony’s
The Revolution, and later from Lucy Stone’s The Women’s Journal.98  Its
actual and intended audience was primarily men, especially male lawyers,
judges, legislators, and businessmen.99  Bradwell built her readership by
promptly publishing legal decisions from state and federal courts, allowing
attorneys to read these decisions well in advance of the published state report-
ers.100  Alongside the court decisions, she published stories and editorials that
described the dire consequences of women’s legal inequality.101  She urged her
large readership to support the enactment and enforcement of law reforms
aimed at securing women’s equality, including the MWPAs.102
In 1869, Bradwell published a full accounting of the way the Illinois
Supreme Court had interpreted and applied the Illinois MWPA since its enact-
ment in 1861.103  She first discussed the way the court altered the original
intent of the statute.104  Bradwell explained that, although the court acknowl-
edged the act was intended to be and did effect a root change in the rights of
93 See Women in Iowa, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 25, 1869, at 100 (Bradwell asserts her
interpretation on the amendments).
94 See Basch, supra note 28, at 52-53.
95 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 41-42.
96 See The Chicago Legal News, in 6 INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO:  THE BENCH AND BAR 642, 642
(1896).  Because the laws of coverture still applied, Bradwell petitioned the Illinois legisla-
ture for a special charter that allowed her to enter into contracts and own her own business.
Id.  Under the authority of her charter, Bradwell founded the Chicago Legal News, the city’s
only weekly legal newspaper. Id.  She and her husband then established a publishing com-
pany that printed and published the paper. Id.
97 Women in Iowa, supra note 93.
98 See BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 76-77 (describing the similarities in mission of The
Revolution and The Woman’s Journal and Mary Livermore’s The Agitator, which merged
with The Women’s Journal).
99 See Prospectus, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 3, 1868, at 1.
100 See The Chicago Legal News, supra note 96, at 642.
101 See Goddard, supra note 44, at 112-14.
102 Bradwell argued that a woman “has a right to think and act as an individual.” Woman’s
Right to Vote, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, July 7, 1868, at 45.
103 Married Women’s Separate Property Under Act of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov.13,
1869, at 53.
104 See id.
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married women, its interpretation and application of the law as an economic
measure blunted its transformational purpose.105  Bradwell specified that in its
initial construction of the act, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the legisla-
ture “designed to make, and did make, a radical and thorough change in the
condition of a feme covert.”106  The court then discounted this design, however,
by asserting that the legislature’s real motivation was the volatile emerging
marketplace, where “excitement and speculation, by which fortunes are
wrecked in a moment, and the innocent made to suffer from no misconduct of
their own.”107  “The object of the legislature,” the court explained, “was, not to
loosen the bonds of matrimony, or create an element of constant strife between
husband and wife, but to protect the latter against the misfortunes, imprudence,
or possible vice of the former, by enabling her to withhold her property from
being levied on and sold for the payment of his debts, or squandered by him
against her wishes.”108  Through its decisions, the court reshaped the law’s pur-
pose into a perpetuation, rather than a transformation, of the status regime.
In her paper, Bradwell also highlighted the way the court used its interpre-
tation of the act to significantly limit its scope.109  She emphasized, disapprov-
ingly, the court’s finding that the act did not include a wife’s earnings or any
property she bought with those earnings as her sole property.110  The court
ruled instead that these belonged to her husband.111  It also held that the law
did not eliminate curtesy, and therefore a wife could not sell her real property
without her husband’s consent.112  Further, the court found that the act only
allowed a married woman to enter into contracts regarding her separate prop-
erty.113  But it did not remove other common law liabilities that prohibited her
from entering into other contracts, engaging in trade, or acting as a surety for
her husband.114  Finally, emphasizing its commitment to coverture, the court
ruled that because the husband owned his wife’s earnings and had the limited
right of curtesy, he was still liable for his wife’s debts.115
Following the law activists in New York and elsewhere, Bradwell engaged
in a vigorous campaign for a married woman’s earnings law and a law that
granted women equal guardianship rights to their children in Illinois.116  In the
CLN, she explained the proposed statutes and published arguments in favor of
105 See Elijah v. Taylor, 37 Ill. 247, 249 (1865).
106 Emerson v. Clayton, 32 Ill. 493, 497 (1863).
107 Id. at 496.
108 Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill. 58, 64 (1867).
109 See SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 101 (arguing that the same phenomenon occurred in
other states).  The courts did not interpret the statutes as an abolishment of coverture, rather
they collaborated with their state legislatures to reconcile the tensions created by married
women’s property rights and coverture. Id.
110 Married Women’s Separate Property Under Act of 1861, supra note 103.
111 See Bear v. Hays, 36 Ill. 280, 281 (1865); see also Farrell v. Patterson, 43 Ill. 52, 58
(1867).
112 See Cole, 44 Ill. at 66.
113 See Carpenter v. Mitchell, 50 Ill. 470, 471-72 (1869).
114 Id. at 474. 
115 See Connor v. Berry, 46 Ill. 370, 372 (1868).
116 See Custody of Children, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 29, 1871, at 243; Talk with the Legis-
lature, supra note 83; see also Custody of Children in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 18,
1872, at 252; The Legal Existence of the Wife, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 25, 1873, at 211.
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the reforms to win the support of the male legal community and as an indirect
appeal to the legislature.117  She dramatically described the negative effect the
law had on laboring women who were married to financially irresponsible
husbands:
since the Supreme Court decided that the act of 1861 did not extend to the earnings
of a married woman, and that they belonged to the husband, and might be taken to
pay his debts[,] [r]ich shoddy creditors of the husband have ever since been taking to
pay his debts the money earned by the honest toil of the wife, for the purpose of
supporting her ragged, starving children, which a drunken or unfortunate husband
failed to provide for, and the law still remains the same.118
Bradwell also appealed to men’s economic interests, publishing articles
that criticized the court’s findings that the 1861 act did not relieve a husband
from the common law liability for his wife’s debts and exempted a wife’s prop-
erty from liability for her own debts as well as her husband’s.119
The state legislature responded in 1869 with a second MWPA.120  As in
other states, the new law granted married women limited additional property
rights.121  It deemed a married woman’s earnings her sole and separate property
and allowed a married woman to sue in her own name.122  But, it did not grant
her equal guardianship rights to their children, nor address the concerns of
those who believed that husbands and wives would use the law to evade credi-
tors, as it failed to remove the common law prohibition against suing a married
woman.123  Bradwell agreed with the law’s opponents that the statutory amend-
ments were inadequate, but explained her objection was not because the law
encouraged swindling, but because it failed to make women’s property rights
and obligations equal to men’s under the law.124  “[A married woman is a]
citizen of our State and of the United States . . . as much a citizen as a married
man,” Bradwell asserted.125  Women should have the full benefits and obliga-
tions of that status.126  Another five years passed before the 1874 Illinois legis-
lature passed a third MWPA.127  This act moved married women’s property
rights closer to formal equality, but still failed to displace the underlying status
regime.128
Law activists continued their fight for married women’s property rights
throughout the nineteenth century as they broadened their agenda.129  They
linked their MWPA campaigns with campaigns for other civil and political
117 Laws Relating to Women, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 31, 1868, at 37.
118 Id.
119 See Married Woman’s Property, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 14, 1868, at 53; Letter to the
Editor, The Property Rights of Married Women, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 12, 1868, at 85.




124 Married Woman’s Property, supra note 119.
125 Married Women’s Separate Property Under Act of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 27,
1869, at 68.
126 Bradwell asserted that if a “judgment be recovered against her. . . [a married woman’s]
separate property [should] be sold to satisfy it.” Id.
127 68 Ill. Laws 576, 576-78 (1874).
128 See Husband and Wife, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 31, 1874, at 153.
129 See infra Parts I.B, II.
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rights, including woman suffrage.130  As women learned in the law, they con-
tinued to apply their strategy of advocating law reforms to secure women’s full
emancipation and equality.131  Their campaigns were a core part of the early
women’s rights movement, but their focus on rights claims and law reform
made them exceptional in the decades after the Civil War.  It allowed them to
maintain relationships with most women’s rights associations despite divisions
that arose between and among those groups, most dramatically within the
woman suffrage movement.132
B. Woman Suffrage
The law activists emerged as a distinct faction within the women’s rights
movement when the leaders of the movement divided over the issue of suf-
frage. Part of the story is familiar.  Woman suffrage was one of the central law
reforms women’s rights activists demanded during the movement’s formalizing
conventions in the 1840s and 1850s.133  After the Civil War, women’s rights
activists who had fought for the abolition of slavery, as well as women’s eman-
cipation, believed the government would enfranchise all African Americans
and all women.134  When Congress passed constitutional amendments that
granted suffrage to black men alone, an independent woman suffrage move-
ment emerged.135  Suffragists then divided among themselves over whether to
support the Fifteenth Amendment as they fought for woman suffrage, or
whether to denounce it because women were not included.136
The less familiar part of the story is the emergence of a connected, yet
distinct, law reform movement.  To be clear, the leaders of the woman suffrage
movement continued to support a broad range of law reform campaigns to
advance women’s rights in the second half of the nineteenth century, but they
subordinated those efforts to securing the vote.137  Further, they allowed their
position on the Fifteenth Amendment and their suffrage strategies to divide
themselves from each other.138  Women law activists did not.  They maintained
an extensive law reform agenda that included but did not privilege suffrage,
and they maintained relationships with both of the main, oppositional suffrage
camps.139  Myra Bradwell served as a leader of this law activist faction.140
Law activists articulated their law reform agenda at a suffrage convention
in Illinois in 1869.141  After the Civil War, women suffragists in Illinois, as in
other states, proposed a woman suffrage provision as part of the state’s new
130 See infra Parts I.B, II.
131 See infra Parts I.B, II.
132 See infra Parts I.B, II.
133 FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 87, at 136-37.
134 See DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 53-55.
135 See id. at 189-202.
136 See id. at 162-202; FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 87, at 145-48.
137 DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 18-20.
138 See id. at 162-202; FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 87, at 145-48.
139 See infra Part II.
140 See infra Part II; see also BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 62-64 (summarizing Bradwell’s
leadership role in the women’s rights movement and her focus on women’s legal rights).
141 See Chicago Woman Suffrage Convention, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 20 1869, at 164.
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constitution.142  Illinois was one of many states spurred by the enactment of the
Thirteenth Amendment (1865) and the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) to hold
constitutional conventions to redefine the roles of individuals, the law, and the
state in light of these new amendments.143  In preparation of the Illinois con-
vention, the Woman’s Association (later Chicago Sorosis), one of the city’s
first woman’s clubs, determined to hold a suffrage convention to generate sup-
port for a woman suffrage provision in the new state constitution.144  During
the planning stages, however, significant debates over political strategy caused
some of the members to leave the club and form a second woman’s suffrage
association.145  The conflicts were similar to the rift that occurred between the
leaders of the national woman’s suffrage movement over the Fifteenth Amend-
ment during the same period,146 but the outcome was distinguishable.
The law activists in Illinois, and Bradwell principal among them, refused
to allow the debate over women suffragists’ support of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to determine their associations or their strategies.147  Like all woman suf-
fragists, they were frustrated by the Republican Party’s failure to include
women in the suffrage provision.148  Yet, they continued to support Lucy
Stone, the subsequent leader of the American Woman Suffrage Association
(AWSA), and other national leaders who, nonetheless, endorsed the amendment
that gave African American men alone the vote.149  They also continued to
support Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, who denounced the
Fifteenth Amendment, since women were not included, and subsequently
established the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA).150  The Illi-
nois law activists carved out a middle ground.
To maintain this middle ground, they focused on the issue with which the
oppositional factions agreed, that women secure the right to vote.151  Bradwell
joined with a number of other law activists and woman suffragists who formed
their own association, the Illinois Women’s Suffrage Association (IWSA), at a
142 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (2000). See also BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 103.
143 See JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970, at 56-64 (1972).
144 See The Women’s Association, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1868, at 1 (documenting its founding
and its goal: “to increase the social relations of women and mankind, and to advocate any-
thing that will, in any way, tend to promote the welfare of both sexes—the female sex
especially”); see also Lana Ruegamer, Livermore, Mary Ashton Rice, in WOMEN BUILDING
CHICAGO, supra note 44, at 512, 512-514 (documenting the name change of the Woman’s
Association to the Chicago Sorosis).
145 See BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 68.
146 Id. at 71.
147 See id. at 104-05.
148 See DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 163-64; see also BUECHLER,
supra note 90, at 69-76.
149 See DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 163-64; see also BUECHLER,
supra note 90, at 69-76.
150 See DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 163-64; see also BUECHLER,
supra note 90, at 69-76.
151 See DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 164 (arguing that although
there was a split in the suffrage movement, the two rival organizations advanced cause of
woman suffrage).
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separate convention in Chicago in February 1869.152  During its first two years
the IWSA resolved to remain impartial in the fight between the national leaders
and focused its efforts on advancing a law reform agenda—the IWSA’s first act
was to create a commission dedicated to advocating changes in the laws affect-
ing the social and legal status of women.153  One of its leaders, Judge Charles
Waite (who was a member of the state’s first women’s rights association in
1855) drafted a resolution calling for woman suffrage to be included in the new
state constitution.154  Judge Waite also demanded an end to any legal barrier
that limited women’s full participation in “social, civil and political life.”155
Myra Bradwell, who was elected corresponding secretary, detailed the organi-
zation’s agenda in the CLN.156
The law activists worked for a number of critical rights they believed were
necessary for women to achieve liberty and equality.157  As they were advocat-
ing for suffrage laws, either as a state statute, a state constitutional provision, or
a federal constitutional amendment, they simultaneously sought additional law
reforms to further their cause.158  But because law reform was their primary
strategy, they recognized that advocating from outside the legal system was not
enough.159  They determined to change their relationship with the legal system
to become accepted members inside the legal profession.160  Myra Bradwell
was among the first of this small group to seek official entry into the male legal
realm.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WOMEN’S LAW REFORM MOVEMENT:
WOMEN LAWYERS AND THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR A
NEW JURISPRUDENCE
The law activists never formalized their law reform movement by naming
it or establishing a separate, specific organization.  The members included
those committed to the strategy of securing women’s rights through a broad
range of law reforms and the networks they developed.161  The movement took
152 See BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 75; see also 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra
note 71, at 564-65.
153 Woman’s Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1870, at 4 (citing and discussing the resolution the
IWSA passed regarding its refusal to join either the AWSA or the NWSA:  “Resolved, That
while we sympathize with the objects had in view in the formation of the National Women
Suffrage Associations formed in Cleveland and New York, we will not become auxiliary to
either, until the difficulties between the two are settled.”). See also Chicago Woman Suf-
frage Convention, supra note 141.
154 See Woman’s Kingdom, CHI. INTER OCEAN, May 20, 1882 (published a reprint of Judge
Waite’s 1869 convention speech).
155 See The Women, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1869, at 4.
156 BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 69-73; Chicago Woman Suffrage Convention, supra note
141.
157 See supra note 59; see also infra Part II.
158 See supra note 59; see also infra Part II.
159 See Grace H. Harte, The Battle for the Right of Women to Practice Law, 33 WOMEN
LAW. J. 141, 145 (1947) (describing the historical fight for women to be lawyers and arguing
that their motivation for the fight was that “the doors of the temple of justice must be opened
to women”).
160 See id. at 141-45.
161 See infra Parts II, III.
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shape as a handful of law activists determined to become licensed lawyers.
They saw the period of reconstruction, after the Civil War, as their opportunity
to infiltrate the legal profession.162  They developed new legal arguments to
both persuade courts and legislatures to grant them a law license and to ensure
that their law reforms were enacted and enforced.163
In the summer of 1869, working in mixed-sex, loosely formed networks,
two women (both white) applied for a state license to practice law, and five
women (four white and one African American) enrolled in the few law depart-
ments in the country that would admit women.164  Their motivation for entering
the legal profession was threefold:  (1) they sought to establish that women had
the right to work in any profession or occupation; (2) they wanted to practice
law as a career; and (3) they intended to use their positions as lawyers—official
members inside the legal system—to advance and enforce the social, civil, and
political rights of women.165  Their efforts were not individual, but rather part
of a collective effort.166  Myra Bradwell, who was the second American
woman to apply for a law license (and the only one of this group whose appli-
cation was denied),167 became the leader of this collective.168  She used her
licensure case and her legal newspaper, the CLN, to foster the development of
trans-state networks that became the core of the women’s law reform move-
ment over the next several decades.169
The legal profession to which these women sought entry was in the midst
of transformation.  The new, and increasingly dominant, view was that law was
a science and should be interpreted and administered only by professional
162 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 107.
163 See infra Part II.A; see also Gilliam, supra note 41, at 112 (arguing that Bradwell’s
reasoning in her case deviated from conventional judicial reasoning).
164 Arabella Mansfield applied for her law license in Iowa on June 15, 1869. See Dorothy
Thomas, Arabella Mansfield, in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 44, at at 492,
493.  Myra Bradwell applied for her law license in Illinois in September 1869. See A
Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold any Office in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870,
at 145.  Lemma Barkaloo and Phoebe Couzins gained admission to the law school at Wash-
ington University in St. Louis, after Barkaloo was initially denied admission to the law
school at Columbia University.  African American Mary Ann Shadd Carey was admitted to
Howard University Law School in Washington, D.C.  Sarah Kilgore and Ada Kepley were
admitted to the University of Chicago Law School.  Also in their class at the University of
Chicago was Richard A. Dawson, the first African American man admitted to the law
school. See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 37, 45; MORELLO, supra note
41, at 46-53; Ellen A. Martin, Admission of Women to the Bar, 1 CHI. L. TIMES 76, 76, 78
(1887); Lelia J. Robinson, Women Lawyers in the United States, 2 GREEN BAG 10, 13, 17, 28
(1890).
165 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Foreword:  A Real Revolution, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 719,
726 (2001) (arguing that nearly all of the first women lawyers were feminists and that they
became lawyers to further the women’s rights movement); cf. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW,
supra note 42, at 50-51 (arguing that the motivations of the first generation of women law-
yers to enter the profession were diverse, though Drachman does assert that some were
motivated by the desire to use the law to advance women’s rights).
166 See Babcock, supra note 42, at 1699 (arguing that when the individual efforts of the first
women lawyers are considered together, they reveal a “larger movement”).
167 See Robinson, supra note 164, at 14. See generally infra Part II.
168 See I The Bench and Bar of Illinois 277 (John M. Palmer ed., 1899).
169 See Goddard, supra note 44, at 112-14.
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experts.170  Elite lawyers sought to discount the philosophy promoted in the
early nineteenth century by President Andrew Jackson that the learned profes-
sions did not require any special qualifications and should be open to ordinary
men.171  Law schools, in large part due to the work of Christopher Columbus
Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School, were replacing apprenticeships as the
preferred method of studying law.172  These developments, coupled with pres-
sure from elite lawyers to exclude the growing numbers of non-elites seeking
entrance to the profession (immigrant and African American men, and all
women) inspired state legislatures to revive law licensing and certification
requirements for admission.173
Against the intentions of the elite, these transformations of the legal sys-
tem provided women and minority men new opportunities to demand their
equality before the law and to become lawyers.174  The proliferation of law
schools created a number of institutions that admitted women and minority
men.175  The new statutes setting requirements for a law license standardized
admissions and lessened the opportunities for nepotism and overt discrimina-
tion.176  Further, the Fourteenth Amendment, which deemed as citizens all men
and women born in the United States and those naturalized, provided new legal
arguments for women’s rights activists to employ in their movement.177
Included in these arguments were demands that would be the basis for a legal
philosophy known later as sociological jurisprudence.178
Legal thought also was in transition in the decades after the war.  Elite
lawyers and Justices employed an ideology that William Wiecek labels “legal
classicism.”179  Legal classicists believed the legal order was an “autonomous,
170 See Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 72,
89-91 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); see also BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PRO-
FESSIONALISM:  THE MIDDLE-CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN
AMERICA 86-88 (1976); BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE “TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL” IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 186, 192-93, 245-50 (1992); THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Hathan
O. Hatch ed., 1988).
171 See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PRO-
FESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 210 (1991).  From the Revolution to 1869, the American legal pro-
fession had been exclusively male in membership and character.  The characteristics of a
lawyer, as delineated by Michael Grossberg, were “camaraderie, competitiveness, physical
courage, practicality, personal trust, oratorical prowess, entrepreneurial skill, and an aversion
to bookishness[,]” all traits were associated with masculinity in the nineteenth century.
Michael Grossberg, Institutionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine Profession, in
MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD:  CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 133,
137 (Mark C. Carnes & Clyde Griffen eds., 1990).
172 See HALL, supra note 59, at 218-21.
173 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MOD-
ERN AMERICA 96, 100 (1976).
174 Id. at 81, 88, 98, 295.
175 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 43-51; FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at
620; MORELLO, supra note 41, at 39-87.
176 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 634.
177 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Basch, supra note 28, at 53;  Dubois, supra note 24, at
21.
178 WIECEK, supra note 46, at 191.
179 Id. at 3.
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determinate, natural, neutral, necessary, objective, and apolitical structure of
principles and norms.”180  Most legal and historical scholars credit Justice Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes as one of the first intellectuals to question the notion that
judicial decisions were based on such detached criteria.181  Populists, and then
the Progressives, were the first to politically attack classicism.182
The core of the movement to replace classicism is most often tied to Ros-
coe Pound, a law professor and later Dean of Harvard Law School.183  Pound
coined the term “sociological . . . jurisprudence” in the first decade of the twen-
tieth century in his call for “pragmatism as a philosophy of law.”184  Pound
asserted that the law ought to address current social needs and secure social
justice.185  But Pound was not the first to articulate these arguments.  Women’s
rights activists made these demands in the years after the Civil War, when a
handful of Radical Republicans and women law activists sought to remove the
gender barriers to the legal profession as part of the women’s rights
movement.186
A. Myra Bradwell’s Case and the Gendered Origins of Sociological
Jurisprudence
The movement to open the legal profession to women began in Iowa.  A
small group of Radical Republican judges and lawyers who had been attempt-
ing to use the law and legal system to secure liberty and equality for African
Americans organized the effort.187  Judge Francis Springer, a leader in this
movement, encouraged Arabella Babb Mansfield, a married white woman, to
seek admission to practice law in the state.188  Mansfield, who had been study-
ing law for two years in her brother’s law office while a professor at Iowa
Wesleyan, agreed.189  On June 15, 1869, she applied to the Iowa District Court
for her law license.190  As the presiding judge, Springer appointed two male
lawyers who supported women’s rights to examine her.191  Each passed Mans-
field with high honors, noting their authority to admit Mansfield rested on her
exceptional ability and “the demands and necessities of the present time and
180 Id. at 175, 177-80. See also HALL, supra note 59, at 223; MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3,
109-42 (1992); Gordon, supra note 170, at 70-71 (arguing that elite lawyers during this time
fought against an instrumental approach to law and advocated instead a scientific, formalist
approach).
181 See HALL, supra note 59, at 223; HOROWITZ, supra note 180, at 109-10.
182 See HOROWITZ, supra note 180, at 3, 109-42; WIECEK, supra note 46, at 177-80.
183 WIECEK, supra note 46, at 191-93.
184 See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908).
185 See id. at 605, 609; see also WIECEK, supra note 46, at 191-93. See generally Roscoe
Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
186 See Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon:  Woman Suffragists and the “Living Consti-
tution,” 76 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1456, 1458 (2001).
187 See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION:  THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 1844-
1944, at 451-55 (1993).
188 See Thomas, supra note 164, at 493.
189 See id.
190 Id.; Louis A. Haselmayer, Belle A. Mansfield, 55 WOMEN LAW. J. 46, 46 (1969).
191 See Thomas, supra note 164, at 493.
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occasion.”192  The committee concluded that Mansfield’s performance in her
examination “has given the very best rebuke possible to the imputation that
ladies can not qualify for the practice of law.”193
The examiners’ remarks helped lay the foundation for a new ideology of
judicial interpretation that would follow, one that required judges to interpret
and apply statutes in light of “the needs and interests and opinions of society of
to-day [sic].”194  The judges needed to employ an ideology that allowed them
to circumvent a literal interpretation of the law.  The Iowa statute regulating the
admission of attorneys restricted the profession to “white male person[s].”195
Judge Springer interpreted the word “male” in the statute to include women,
and admitted Mansfield to the bar.196  He reasoned, “the affirmative declaration
that male persons may be admitted is not implied denial to the right of
females.”197  An article in the local newspaper evidenced popular support for
Springer’s decision, exclaiming Mansfield to be a “lady of strong mind . . . .
That she has the brains and the necessary ability to make a good record for
herself” no one will dispute.198  Women’s rights activists also celebrated and
spread the word of Mansfield’s admission, including publishing an article about
the event in The Revolution.199
Six weeks later, Myra Bradwell applied for her Illinois law license with a
goal to advance the movement.200  Bradwell had received her certificate of
examination and submitted it and her certificate of study to the court as
required by statute.201  She additionally included a brief, as she was the first
woman to apply for a law license in the state.202  The statute governing law
licenses in Illinois used the male pronoun in its recitation of requirements.203
In her brief, Bradwell acknowledged this circumstance but asked the court to
interpret the statute regarding admission to the bar in light of subsequent laws
and grant her application.204
Bradwell’s brief followed the reasoning Judge Springer applied in Mans-
field’s case.  She argued that the law did not overtly include a requirement that
the applicant be male.205  Further, she explained that chapter 90 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes specified, “When any party or person is described or referred
to by words importing the masculine gender, females as well as males shall be
deemed to be included.”206  Bradwell noted that in all fifty-three sections of the
Illinois Chancery Code, the words “woman,” “female,” or any feminine pro-
192 See Martin, supra note 164, at 76.
193 Id. at 77. See also Thomas, supra note 164, at 493; A Married Woman Admitted to the
Bar in Iowa, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 16, 1869, at 20.
194 Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 185, at 611.
195 Haselmayer, supra note 190, at 47.
196 Id.; Thomas, supra note 164, at 493.
197 Haselmayer, supra note 190, at 47.
198 A Married Woman Admitted to the Bar in Iowa, supra note 193.
199 See Woman as Lawyer, REVOLUTION, July 8, 1869, at 10.
200 The XIV Amendment and Our Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 19, 1873, at 354 .
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nouns never appeared, although masculine pronouns were used throughout.207
If the court determined the use of the male pronoun in the section regarding the
practice of law excluded women, Bradwell argued, it would follow that none of
the sections of the chancery code applied to women.208  But because “no
respectable attorney would claim because defendants in chancery are repre-
sented in law by masculine pronouns, that a woman could not be made a defen-
dant in chancery,” Bradwell insisted that she was entitled to her law license.209
When the Illinois court used the doctrine of coverture to support its denial
of her application, Bradwell crystallized the new method of legal reasoning.
She demanded that the court reject the outdated principles and interpret the
statute in light of the current needs, interests, and opinions of society.210  She
gave the Illinois Supreme Court a chance to reconsider its decision, as she
sought to establish legal grounds to take her case beyond the state court should
it rule against her; she submitted an additional brief asserting that though she
was indeed married, “although she believes that fact does not appear in the
record,” being married did not disqualify her from admission to the bar.211
Bradwell attempted to persuade the judges that the common law notions of
coverture no longer applied.212  Women were neither child-like nor burdened
by the limitation of coverture principles; rather, she pronounced that women
stood on a ground of equality with men.213
This alternative method of legal interpretation required judges to consider
the current social and economic circumstances and conditions when applying
the law.214  Bradwell argued that in her case, the justices must consider the new
laws that granted married women property rights, as well as the social advances
women had made in public life.215
The doors of many of our universities and law schools are now open to women upon
an equality with men.  The Government of the United States has employed women in
many of its departments, and appointed many, both single and married, to office.
Almost every large city in the Union has its regularly admitted female physicians . . .
The bar itself is not without its women lawyers, both single and married.216
Bradwell hoped the justices would consider these examples as precedent-
setting changes in the social and legal position of women, and thus apply the
law to her case in line with this changed reality.
Bradwell ended her brief with her boldest invocation of this alternative
mode of judicial interpretation.  She cited a decision by a prominent English
jurist, Lord Mansfield, who found in a separate case that, despite the dictates of





211 Id.; Gilliam, supra note 41, at 113-14.
212 See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold any Office in Illinois, supra note 164.
213 See id.
214 See Winkler, supra note 186, at 1458; see also Gilliam, supra note 41, at 112 (describ-
ing Bradwell’s appeal for a judicial interpretation that employed the principles of equity).
215 See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1524.
216 A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold any Office in Illinois, supra note 164.
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contract and be sued.217  Although Lord Mansfield was considered an instru-
mentalist and was championing a free market, not women’s rights, she argued
that his decision rested on the realization that because social conditions had
changed, the law, too, must change.218  He had to apply the law in light of the
new reality.  According to Bradwell, the justice believed that because “the rea-
son of the law [ceased] the law itself must cease; and that, as the usages of
society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind.”219
Bradwell did not develop these arguments in isolation, but as part of a
mixed-sex network of law activists.  Bradwell participated in and fostered the
growth of this network by reporting on women’s rights endeavors, visiting with
other activists, and participating in women’s rights organizing efforts.220  She
celebrated Arabella Mansfield’s admission to practice law in Iowa in the CLN
and used Mansfield’s case as evidence in the briefs she submitted in her own
case.221  Prior to filing her case, she met with Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth
Cady Stanton on at least three occasions in the first half of 1869.222  Locally,
Bradwell had the support and assistance of her husband, James Bradwell (a
lawyer and Radical Republican), and long-time women’s rights activists, Cath-
arine and Charles Waite.223
Even as Bradwell was responding to the Illinois Supreme Courts’ letter of
denial, other activists within the network were developing a new strategy to
secure women’s rights based on the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ellen Carol
DuBois credits Frances and Virginia Minor with the origins of the New Depar-
ture argument, which included the notion that the right to vote was one of the
privileges and immunities of United States citizens protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.224  Women activists quickly seized on the New Departure argu-
ment and put it into practice by demanding the right to vote.225  The majority of
this activity occurred in 1868 and 1869.226  Bradwell adapted the argument for




220 See Goddard, supra note 44, at 112-14; I THE BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS, supra note
168, at 278-79.
221 See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold any Office in Illinois, supra note 164.
222 See DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, supra note 10, at 180-86 (describing how
Bradwell met with Anthony and Stanton in Chicago in both February, when they participated
in the Illinois Woman Suffrage conference).  Bradwell also attended the Equal Rights Asso-
ciation meeting in May 1869 in New York where Anthony and Stanton argued against sup-
porting the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 186. See also 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
supra note 71, at 569-70 (describing how Bradwell and Stanton went to Springfield, Illinois
in February 1869 after the Chicago convention as part of a committee to lobby the Illinois
legislature to pass an earning law for married women).
223 See Catharine Waugh McCulloch, Catharine Van Valkenburg Waite:  Lawyer, (unpub-
lished biographical sketch, on file with Grace H. Harte, Series III of the Mary Earhart Dillon
Collection, 1890-1945, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
224 See DuBois, supra note 24, at 21-22.
225 See id. at 23.
226 See id.
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women’s right to practice law on the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866
Civil Rights Act.227
Bradwell’s third and final brief to the Illinois Supreme Court included two
constitutional arguments in support of her application, both of which incorpo-
rated the New Departure.228  These arguments challenged the court’s original
use of coverture as grounds for denying her application and established grounds
for an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, should the Illinois court once
again deny her application.229  The first claim was that the denial of her appli-
cation based on her status as a married woman violated her United States citi-
zenship rights set forth in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act.230  Bradwell quoted the portion of the
act that guaranteed all United States citizens the “full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property,” and asserted
that this granted her “the right to exercise and follow the profession of an attor-
ney-at law upon the same terms, conditions and restrictions as are applied to
and imposed upon every other citizen of the State of Illinois, and none
other.”231  Bradwell reasoned that because she had complied with all of the
state requirements for admission to the bar, “it is contrary to the true . . . mean-
ing of said amendment and said ‘Civil Rights Bill,’ for your petitioner to be
refused a license to practice law, upon the sole ground of her ‘married
condition.’”232
Bradwell based her second claim on the Fourth Article of the United
States Constitution, not the Fourteenth Amendment, but adapted the New
Departure argument to this constitutional provision as well; she asserted that
Illinois had violated the privileges and immunities of her state citizenship
under the Fourth Article.233  Because she had formerly been a citizen of Ver-
mont, by virtue of being born there, Bradwell claimed that when she moved to
Illinois, she was guaranteed the full privileges and immunities that were
granted to every other citizen of that state.234  Bradwell argued that one of these
protected privileges was “the right to follow any professional pursuit under the
laws . . . [including] a right to receive a license to practice law upon the same
terms and conditions as the most favored citizen of the State of Illinois.”235
Bradwell claimed that even as a married woman, she was a full citizen, and
therefore deserved equal treatment under the law.236
The Illinois Supreme Court employed classical legal reasoning in its
denial of Bradwell’s appeal, and drew on a mixture of natural law, common
law (and its status regime), and positive law to support its decision.237  In Sep-








235 Gilliam, supra note 41, at 115.
236 See LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES:  WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 87-117 (1998).
237 See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869).
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tember of 1869, Chief Justice Charles B. Lawrence issued the opinion for the
court ruling definitively that married or not, no woman could be admitted to the
Illinois bar.238  He explained that the court could “not admit any persons or
class of persons [to the practice of law] who are not intended by the
[l]egislature to be admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly
required by the statute.”239  The court first asserted that the legislature had
established the bar’s admission requirements with the dominant notions of gen-
der that limited women’s citizenship rights in mind and purposefully excluded
them from participating in public office.240  The court then explained that the
positive law was based on the natural legal principle that women were not
equal with men:  “That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of
action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute the laws, was
regarded as an almost axiomatic truth” when the legislature made the law gov-
erning the bar admission.241  The court was keenly aware of the growing legal
demands of the women’s rights movement and their revolutionary potential.242
It denounced the movement and the social upheaval that surely would follow:
This step [granting Bradwell a law license], if taken by us, would mean that in the
opinion of this tribunal, every civil office in this State may be filled by women—that
it is in harmony with the spirit of the Constitution and laws that women should be
made governors, judges and sheriffs.  This we are not yet prepared to hold.243
Bradwell had always understood and intended that the issues in her case
extended far beyond the right to practice law.  Hence, she interpreted the
court’s decision as a denial of women’s citizenship.  “[W]hat the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States was in the Dred Scott case was to the
rights of negroes as citizens of the United States, this decision[,]” charged
Bradwell, “is to the political rights of women in Illinois—annihilation.”244
Through her case and the other legal reforms pressed by the developing
women’s law reform movement, Bradwell sought to establish women as auton-
omous individuals with full citizenship rights, privileges, and obligations.
Bradwell decided to appeal the court’s decision, thus continuing her attempt to
secure women’s civil right to work in their chosen field through the courts.  But
the court’s dicta outlined an additional strategy with which women law reform
activists were already experienced.245  The court’s suggestion that “[i]f the leg-
islature shall choose to remove the existing barriers and authorize us to issue
licenses equally to men and women we shall cheerfully obey,” inspired
Bradwell and other activists to also attempt to change the law.246
Bradwell first concentrated on her appeal, attempting to frame it in the
broadest possible terms, casting the case as a women’s rights issue.  She sought
a decision from the United States Supreme Court that would establish defini-
238 See id. at 535-42.
239 A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold any Office in Illinois, supra note 164.
240 See id.
241 Id. See also Olsen, supra note 45, at 1524-25.
242 See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1524-25.
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tively that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act confirmed
woman’s status as full citizens entitled to due process protections and equal
rights, opening the way for married and single women in every state to become
licensed attorneys and much more.247  She hired United States Senator Mat-
thew Carpenter to argue her case.248  An eight-year veteran of the Supreme
Court bar, Carpenter was a leading expert on constitutional issues, one of the
most effective advocates of his day, and favored woman’s suffrage.249
Carpenter based the appeal on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby only partially complied with Bradwell’s
intentions.  He cast the issue as “a question not of taste, propriety or politeness,
but of civil right,” and directly asserted that women were citizens.250  “The
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment declares,” Carpenter wrote, “‘all persons born and
naturalized in the United States, etc., are citizens of the United States, and of
the [s]tate wherein they reside.’”251  “Of course,” he explained, “women, as
well as men, are included in this provision, and recognized as citizens.”252
Carpenter did not, however, present Bradwell’s argument that the court’s denial
of her law license violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and he distinguished suffrage from the right to work.253  Carpen-
ter stayed clear of arguments based on gender equality because of the Justices’
outspoken opposition to woman suffrage.254  Carpenter argued that the right to
work in an occupation was a right of citizenship that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected from state interference, but qualified that allowing women the
civil right to practice law would not be grounds to give women the political
right to vote.255
There is no record regarding Bradwell’s reaction to Carpenter’s strategy.
Bradwell reprinted Carpenter’s argument in its entirety in the CLN and
refrained from commenting on his omission of a Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claim or his distinction between the right to work and the right to
vote.256  Although Bradwell clearly supported woman suffrage, her silence on
his strategy may reveal one of the distinctions between an activist woman law-
yer working within the system and the radical suffragists that used civil disobe-
dience to challenge the system.  Susan B. Anthony’s widely studied use of the
New Departure dramatically illustrates the difference.257  After Anthony was
arrested for attempting to vote, she defended herself by denouncing the male
247 The XIV Amendment and Our Case, supra note 200.
248 Gilliam, supra note 41, at 116.
249 See id.
250 Supreme Court of the United States, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 108.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 120; Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 250.
254 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 120.
255 See HOFF, supra note 41, at 168; Gilliam, supra note 41, at 120.
256 See Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 250; see also Gilliam, supra note
41, at 119 (suggesting that Bradwell did not even see Carpenter’s brief until after he submit-
ted it).
257 See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights,
Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 81, 100-05.
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legal system; “[l]aws [are] made by men, under a government of men, inter-
preted by men and for the benefit of men[,]” Anthony told the court.258  “The
only chance women have for justice in this country is to violate the law, as I
have done, and as I shall continue to do[.]”259  As a lawyer, Bradwell employed
a more conservative rights-claim strategy that required adherence to the court
and a method of incremental change.
When the Supreme Court ruled against Bradwell, it also based its reason-
ing on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.260
Following Carpenter’s argument, the Court framed the issue as whether a state
can set regulations that limit a citizen’s right to work.261  It considered
Bradwell’s case along with several cases from New Orleans involving the right
of the state to control the slaughterhouse industry in that city.262  Specifically,
the Slaughterhouse cases asked the Supreme Court to decide if a state regula-
tion that resulted in an infringement on the right of one or more citizens to
pursue their occupation was a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.263  These two cases were the first opportunity
for the court to interpret and apply the new Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of both cases was how to reconcile an individual’s civil right
to work with a state’s right to regulate occupations within its borders.264  At
issue in the Slaughterhouse cases was a new law that prohibited all slaughtering
in New Orleans except at one regulated facility.265  Numerous slaughterhouses
were closed as a result of this law, negatively affecting the livelihood of count-
less butchers.266  Though these workers were exclusively men, like Bradwell,
they argued that the state law was an infringement on their constitutionally
protected right to work.267  In both the Bradwell and the Slaughterhouse cases,
the Court considered the larger implications of its decisions:  a favorable ruling
would make laboring men and women’s right to work in their chosen field
superior to a state’s right to control who works in what occupation or profes-
sion within its borders.
258 See Matilda Joslyn Gage to Editor, LEAVENWORTH TIMES (Kansas), July 3, 1873, avail-
able at http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/sbatrial.html.
259 Id.
260 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 125-26; see also SMITH, supra note 92, at 339-41.
261 Richard L. Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase’s Dissent and the “Sphere of
Women’s Work,” 59 LA. L. REV. 521, 525 (1999); DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own
Hands, supra note 24, at 32.
262 Aynes, supra note 261, at 521-25; DuBois, supra note 24, at 32; Olsen, supra note 45, at
1526-27.
263 See generally Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom:  Justice Miller, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994);
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner:  Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1996).
264 See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1525-26; see also Aynes, supra note 261, at 524-25;
DuBois, supra note 24, at 32.
265 See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 230 (1996).
266 See RONALD M. LABB ´E & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:  REGULA-
TION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 185-87 (2003).
267 Id.  See also Aynes, supra note 261, at 524-25; DuBois, supra note 24, at 32; Olsen,
supra note 45, at 1525-26.
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Matthew Carpenter, who served as Bradwell’s counsel and also repre-
sented the Slaughter-House Company in the Louisiana cases, argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment did protect an individual’s right to work, but distin-
guished factually between the two cases.268  Carpenter argued in Bradwell’s
case that the right to work in one’s chosen occupation was a privilege protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.269  In the Slaughterhouse cases, however, Car-
penter argued that the Louisiana law limiting the right to work was an accept-
able use of the state’s police power.270  The Supreme Court considered these
two cases together and announced the Louisiana case first.271  Upholding the
Louisiana law, it based its decision on its interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, saying that the state laws in question, which effectively
regulated a citizen’s right to pursue an occupation, did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment because they were a legitimate use of the state’s power.272
This ruling set up its decision in the Bradwell case, announced one day later,
upholding the denial of Bradwell’s application to practice law.273
The majority decision in Bradwell’s case, supported by five of the nine
Justices, based its ruling on constitutional grounds and abstained from any
comment of the issue of women’s rights.274  Relying on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court ruled that the right to practice law was not a right protected
under its Privileges and Immunities Clause.275  It left the regulation of licensing
attorneys to each state.276  The Court chose not to comment on the lower
court’s rationale that was based on a patriarchal interpretation of natural law.277
The majority also avoided a ruling on the state’s relationship to women, though
its decision effectively upheld limitations imposed by state governments on
women’s rights, including women’s right to work in their chosen occupation
and suffrage.
Justice Bradley, joined by two other Justices (all three of whom dissented
in the Slaughterhouse cases), concurred in the decision but rejected the majority
reasoning in an attempt to use the case to explicitly define the relationship
between women and the state.278  Bradley argued, consistent with his position
in the Slaughterhouse cases, that the Fourteenth Amendment created a new
general rule making positive the natural right of a male citizen to pursue his
268 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 118.
269 See Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”:  Second-Class Female Citizenship and the
American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 260 (1989).
270 E. BRUCE THOMPSON, MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER, WEBSTER OF THE WEST 100-01
(1954).
271 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 125.
272 See The Butchers’ Benevolent Ass’n v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co. (The Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
273 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 125.
274 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872); see also Olsen, supra note
45, at 1527.
275 Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139.
276 See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1525-26; see also HOFF, supra note 41, at 165; Gilliam,
supra note 41, at 122; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and
the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328, 339-41 (David
Kairys, ed., 1998).
277 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 137-38.
278 See id. at 140-42; Gilliam, supra note 41, at 126-27; Olsen, supra note 45, at 1528-29.
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chosen occupation.279  Therefore, Bradley implied, as he had asserted in the
Slaughterhouse cases, a state could not interfere with that right without due
process of law.280  Through Bradwell’s case, Bradley sought to establish that
women were exempt from this rule.  Justice Bradley rested his decision on
women’s gendered status, invoking the principles of both natural law and the
common law that separated men and women into different spheres.281  Women
had no right to practice law, he reasoned, as the law fell completely within
man’s sphere.282
The Bradwell majority’s silence on issues of natural law and common law,
and the fact that its opinion allowed for individual state legislatures to pass
laws that would give women the right to practice law, represented the early
stages of a transition in the dominant gender ideology.283  Beyond the Court,
there was some evidence that a growing number of men in the legal community
also rejected Bradley’s invocation of women’s limitations based on their gender
status and embraced instead a new role for women that conformed to the princi-
ples of American liberalism.284  When the majority opinion by Justice Miller
was read in open court, those in attendance received the decision somberly and
silently.285  In contrast, when Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion was read,
the lawyers in the courtroom openly expressed their amusement.286  The dis-
course opposing the separate sphere ideology had become sufficiently perva-
sive that Bradley’s attempt to require all women to be only wife and mother
elicited ridicule.287  Over the next two decades, aspiring women lawyers con-
tinued in a joint effort with activist men to advance women’s rights claims,
opening the legal profession to women one state at a time.
B. Developing Networks to Advance Women’s Law Reforms
In the second half of the nineteenth century, many of the women’s rights
activists who sought a law license created networks with activist male lawyers
to advance their rights claims and continued to employ the ideology of socio-
logical jurisprudence to support their cause.288  Their strategy, to become offi-
cial actors within the legal system, necessitated that they work with men,289 but
most of the coalitions were built on mutual respect and the pursuit of a common
279 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 140-41; see also Gilliam, supra note 41, at 126-27.
280 The Butchers’ Benevolent Ass’n v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-
House Co. (The Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 506 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
281 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 140-42; Gilliam, supra note 41, at 126-27; Olsen,
supra note 45, at 1528; Taub & Schneider, supra note 276, at 339-42.
282 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141; Gilliam, supra note 41, at 127.
283 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 24.
284 See SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 139 (arguing that Bradley’s concurrence overstated the
prejudice against women by 1873).
285 See ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 192-93 (1936);
Gilliam, supra note 41, at 125.
286 See BATES, supra note 285, at 192-93; Gilliam, supra note 41, at 125.
287 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 126.
288 See infra notes 289-99.
289 See Grossberg, supra note 171, at 137 (describing the male make-up and character of the
legal profession).
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goal.  The networks developed locally at first, growing into a national move-
ment by the late nineteenth century.290  Myra Bradwell, who was a leader in
both her local network and the national effort, fostered the development of the
movement through the CLN.  She championed women’s efforts to become law-
yers and to secure other civil and political rights, as she praised their male
advocates and documented their legal arguments that asked judges and legisla-
tures to change and interpret the law in light of the new social position of
women.
The network of law activists developed in Illinois while the United States
Supreme Court was deliberating Bradwell’s appeal.291  The network included
Myra Bradwell and her husband, James Bradwell, Catharine Waite and her hus-
band, Charles Waite, Ada Kepley and her husband, Henry Kepley, William
Lathrop, and Alta Hulett.292  All of the men were licensed lawyers and all of
the women were studied in the law.293  Ada Kepley was the only woman of the
group that had attended law school.294  Kepley graduated from the original
University of Chicago law department on June 30, 1870,295 the first woman in
the country to earn a Bachelor of Laws degree.296  After she passed the state
bar exam, despite the backing of the dean and many of the faculty, State’s
Attorney Charles H. Reed refused Kepley’s application for her law license.297
Reed cited the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in the Bradwell case as the
290 See infra Part III.A.
291 See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1529-31.
292 See MORELLO, supra note 41, at 49.  For information on Alta Hulett, see JON W. LUN-
DIN, ROCKFORD:  AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 17 (1989); 6 CHARLES D. MOSHER, CENTEN-
NIAL HISTORICAL ALBUMS OF BIOGRAPHIES OF THE CHICAGO BAR 49 (1876); Gwen Hoerr
McNamee, Hulett, Alta May, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO 1790-1990, supra note 44, at
412, 412-14; Charlotte Adelman, A History of Women Lawyers, ILL. B.J., May 1986, at 424,
425; E. Boyton, Woman’s Kingdom, CHI. INTER OCEAN, Mar. 31, 1877, at 6.
293 MORELLO, supra note 41, at 49; McNamee, supra note 292, at 412-14.
294 See 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE , supra note 71, at 572-75 (describing that Hulett,
like Bradwell read law in a law office and Ada Kepley attended University of Chicago law
school); MORELLO, supra note 41, at 49.
295 The first University of Chicago Law School was established in 1859.  In response to the
pressure of Myra Bradwell, the law department agreed to admit women.  In 1870 Ada
Kepley was the law school’s first woman graduate and the first woman to graduate from any
law school in the country.  In 1873 that law school merged with Northwestern University’s
newly formed law school and took the name “The Union College of Law of the Chicago
University and the Northwestern University.”  The law school continued to admit women
and became well known for its support of women in the profession.  In 1891, the merger
between the two universities ended and the Union College of Law became Northwestern
University Law School.  The University of Chicago did not open its own law school again
until 1902. FRANK ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY:  THE FOUNDING OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 12-14, 17, 127 (1977); THOMAS WAKEFIELD GOODSPEED, A HIS-
TORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 14-21 (1916); Robinson, supra note 164, at 10, 13-
14.
296 See Commencement Exercises of the University of Chicago, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, July 2,
1870, at 320 (explaining that Kepley, together with Richard A. Dawson, who simultaneously
became the first black man to earn a law degree in Illinois, graduated from the University of
Chicago Law Department in a class that included twenty-seven white men).  Dawson, along
with the white men in their class who passed the bar examination, received his law license
becoming the second African American admitted to the Illinois bar. Id.
297 See id.
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reason for his denial.298  Kepley understood Reed’s decision as a limitation on
women’s rights, explaining, “Women might be cooks, wash women, floor
scrubbers and do any sort of menial labor at that time, but they were barred
from the so called learned professions.”299
These activists began exploring alternative avenues, apart from the Illinois
Supreme Court, to secure a woman’s right to pursue her occupation of choice.
Bradwell used the CLN to raise the possibility of adding a provision in the new
state constitution.300  Delegates at the constitutional convention, who were on
the verge of adopting a new state constitution, had recently voted against a
proposal to include a provision that would have specifically excluded women
from practicing law.301  Though Bradwell argued that their decision repre-
sented the true will of the people, and reported that the majority had come to
support the advancement of women’s rights and their admittance into the pro-
fession, the delegates rejected her proposed provision establishing women’s
right to practice law.302  Ada Kepley sought out a local judge in her hometown
of Effingham, Illinois, to establish her right to pursue a legal career.303  Judge
Decius admitted Kepley to practice law in his court, defying the state supreme
court, by employing the developing sociological jurisprudence reasoning.304
He asserted that “the motion [to admit Kepley] was proper and in accord with
the spirit of the age.”305  He explained, “if it was the unanimous sense of the
Bar, [I] do not feel at liberty to deny the motion.”306  However, because state
law made it a crime for anyone to practice law in the state without a license,
Kepley refrained from practicing.307
The network’s most organized and concerted effort to secure women’s
right to work in their chosen field was a law reform campaign.  They drew on
their earlier work to secure the married women’s property acts and the growing
support for women’s right to practice law from judges, practitioners, and jour-
nalists throughout the country.  Rather than seek a limited measure that would
allow a select group of women entrance to the legal profession, these activists
determined to use language that would support the right of all women to work,
expanding their opportunities to engage in any field.308  They considered the
bill as another right included in the larger women’s law reform effort.  The law
they drafted in the fall of 1871, “AN ACT to secure to all persons freedom in
the selection of an occupation, profession, or employment,” proposed, “[that]
298 See id.
299 MORELLO, supra note 41, at 49; Peggy Pulliam, Effingham’s Fighting Female, in
EFFINGHAM COUNTY ILLINOIS—PAST AND PRESENT 299, 300 (Hilda Engbring Feldhake ed.,
1968).
300 See Commencement Exercises of the University of Chicago, supra note 296; see also
The Constitutional Convention, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 15, 1870, at 124.
301 See The Constitutional Convention, supra note 300; see also Summary of Events:  Illi-
nois, 5 AM. L. REV. 167, 168 (1870).
302 See The Constitutional Convention, supra note 300.




307 See id.; see also MORELLO, supra note 41, at 49-50.
308 See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1529; see also Gilliam, supra note 41, at 128.
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no person shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or
employment . . . on account of sex.”309
The network’s core activists next engaged in a strenuous campaign to
ensure the bill’s passage.  Myra Bradwell used the CLN to support the cam-
paign to enact the proposed legislation.310  Alta Hulett traveled throughout the
state delivering a lecture in support of the measure entitled “Justice versus the
Supreme Court” that criticized the Illinois Supreme Court for its decision bar-
ring women from the practice of law, demanded the equality of the sexes,
called for an end to discrimination based on sex, and argued that Illinois law
should support women’s right to work.311  “Women have a right to enter upon
any honorable calling or profession that she could fit herself for,” Hulett
explained, positing, “Man had no right by unjust laws or by sentimental
pretences, to circumscribe the field of labor or usefulness of woman.”312  The
crowds, hesitant at first, cheered Hulett by the end of her address.313  She also
argued her case to the joint judiciary committee of the House and Senate.314
Members of the Illinois Legislature were persuaded to grant women the
right to practice law and the right to work in most fields, but they reserved
certain exceptions, signaling their continued rejection of the larger issue of
women’s full equality with men.  Women could not use the law to secure
entrance to the military, engage in the burgeoning and dangerous business of
road construction, or secure the right to serve on juries.315  The insistence on
women’s exclusion from the military was particularly strong in the years fol-
lowing the Civil War, where women had contributed to military efforts in a
myriad of ways, including dressing as men and serving on the front lines.316
Although both the Union and the Confederate Armies used women who volun-
teered their services for the war effort, they refused to grant women any official
position or pay and dismissed those who fought when they discovered their
sex.317  None of the women promoting this legislation commented publicly on
this exclusionary clause or on women’s exclusion from working on road
construction.
309 PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 578 (1872).
310 See The Chicago Legal News, supra note 96, at 642-44 (describing the News had a
national readership and was recognized by both the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois and by the United States Circuit Court as an authority in the
publication of court decisions and legal notifications); Shall Women have the Legal Right to
Follow any Trade, Business or Profession?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS. Dec. 16, 1871, at 68.
311 See Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD J., Dec. 2, 1871, at 2; Miss Alta M.
Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REG., Dec. 2, 1871, at 1; Miss Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD
GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1871, at 1.
312 Miss Hulett’s Lecture, supra note 311.
313 See id.
314 See Alta M. Hulett (unpublished biographical sketch, on file with Grace H. Harte, Series
III of the Mary Earhart Dillon Collection, 1890-1945, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Insti-
tute, Harvard University).
315 PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 578 (1872).
316 See KERBER, supra note 236, at 262-63.
317 See id. at 244, 263.
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Many and varied women’s rights activists did campaign for women’s right
to serve on juries, including these legal women.318  But they supported the bill
with the exceptions, understanding that they would have to secure women’s
civil and political rights incrementally.  They also believed that if the bill
passed, it would provide a way for women to advocate for law reforms from
inside the legal system.319  They argued that women’s presence in the court-
room, both as lawyers and jurors, was essential to influence the way women’s
rights were interpreted and to ensure that women’s rights were enforced.320
Though the Illinois Legislature did not pass a law allowing women to serve on
juries until 1939; in 1872, it was willing to allow women to enter the legal
profession.321
The resistance to the advancement of women’s rights persisted even as the
bill was enacted into law.  It took several votes and much debate before the
legislature passed the bill by the required majority.322  Governor Palmer, who
had declined Myra Bradwell’s application for appointment at Notary Public just
over two years earlier on the grounds of coverture, signed the bill into law.323
The Illinois Supreme Court responded by simultaneously increasing the stan-
dards for securing a law license.  The court adopted an order requiring all can-
didates for the bar complete two years of legal studies, doubling the previous
one-year requirement.324
The law activists had diverse individual responses to the new laws, but as
a movement, they capitalized on the reform.  Bradwell refused to reapply for
admission on principle.325  She believed the Illinois Supreme Court had erred
in its decision and that it should admit her to the practice based on her original
application.326  Ada Kepley delayed reapplying for her license until 1881.327
Although she did assist her husband in his law practice, Kepley’s primary focus
for almost a decade was woman suffrage and temperance reform.328  Hulett
moved to Chicago, studied law for an additional year, and in 1873, re-applied
for her law license.329  She was required to take a second bar examination,
which she passed, receiving the highest score of all twenty-eight applicants.330
318 See generally Holly J. McCammon et al., Becoming Full Citizens:  The U.S. Women’s
Jury Rights Campaigns, the Pace of Reform, and Strategic Adaptation, 113 AM. J. SOC.
1104, 1111 (2008); Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Citizenship before and after
the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 479, 481 (2002).
319 See Harte, supra note 159, at 145.
320 PROTECTIVE AGENCY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1893)
(explaining Attorney Charlotte Holt later explicitly articulated the importance of having
women as lawyers, judges, and observers in the courtroom).
321 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, §§1, 25 (1939).
322 See Liberty of Pursuit Triumphant in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 23, 1872, at 245.
323 See Boyton, supra note 292; John M. Palmer, A Married Woman Cannot be Appointed a
Notary in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 1, 1870, at 109.
324 See Admission to the Bar, 6 AM. L. REV. 369, 369 (1871).
325 See Gilliam, supra note 41, at 128.
326 See Funeral of Myra Bradwell, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 24, 1894, at 208.
327 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 236.
328 See id.
329 See Martin, supra note 164, at 79.
330 See Boyton, supra note 292, at 6; Students Admitted to the Bar in the Supreme Court,
CHI. TRIB., June 7, 1873, at 3.
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On June 4, 1873, two days after her nineteenth birthday, Alta Hulett became the
first licensed woman lawyer in Illinois.331
Illinois was the first state to pass such an enabling statute, but it was not
the only place where women were seeking to become lawyers and gain their
full citizenship rights.332  Bradwell used the CLN to create a network among
rights activists across the country to gain support for those white women and
black women and men who were aspiring to be lawyers, officeholders, jurors,
and voters.333  She also used her paper to criticize courts that continued to limit
their rights.  In 1870 for example, Bradwell reported on a judicial ruling that
excluded black men from serving on a jury in Alton, Illinois.334  She argued
that the exclusion violated the new Amendments and federal laws.335  The fol-
lowing year, she celebrated the ruling of the Wyoming (Territory) Supreme
Court when it ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment established that “[w]omen
are persons . . . entitled to all the privileges of citizenship,” including the right
to vote and to sit on juries.336  Bradwell especially reported on the efforts of
women and minority men to secure a law license.337
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bradwell’s case resulted in
women and African American men fighting to enter the legal profession state
by state.338  Bradwell reported these efforts in the CLN to inform activists
across the country of events in other states and to facilitate the development of
a national movement.  She publicized cases where courts admitted the applicant
without objection, including Charlotte Ray’s 1872 admission in the District of
Columbia, the first African American woman to secure a law license in the
country.339  In cases where a court denied admission, Bradwell published the
arguments made by the applicants and their supporters.340  The cases of Lavinia
Goodell, who applied for a license to practice law before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in 1875, and Belva Lockwood, who applied to practice before
the United States Supreme Court in 1876, are two dramatic examples of women
331 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 134; see also Martin, supra note 164, at 79.
332 DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 6.
333 See generally Goddard, supra note 44, at 112-14.
334 See Colored Jurors, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 8, 1870, at 12.
335 See id.
336 Women as Citizens and Jurors, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 26, 1871, at 381.
337 See infra note 341.
338 See generally SMITH, JR., supra note 187.
339 See Dorothy Thomas, Ray, Charlotte E., in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note
44, at 121, 121; see also A Woman Admitted to the Bar in Missouri, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr.
3, 1870, at 212 (announcing the admission of Lemma Barkalow to the Missouri bar); Women
Admitted to the Bar in Utah, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 5, 1872, at 17 (describing the admis-
sion of Phoebe Couzins and Georgie Snow to the Utah bar); Women As Lawyers in Maine,
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 26, 1872, at 54 (describing the admission of Clara Hapgood Nash to
the Maine bar); Women Lawyers, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 25, 1881, at 340 (discussing the
admission of Nettie Cronise Lutes and her sister Florence Cronise to the Ohio bar).
340 See, e.g., A Woman Cannot Be Admitted to the Bar in Massachusetts, CHI. LEGAL NEWS,
Nov. 12, 1881, at 69 (detailing Leila Robinson’s application, arguments, and denial to the
Massachusetts bar); A Woman Cannot Practice Law in Minnesota, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct.
14, 1876, at 31 (describing the Minnesota court’s denial of Martha Angle Dorsett’s applica-
tion to practice law); see also A Woman Refused Admission to the Bar in Pa., CHI. LEGAL
NEWS, Mar. 15, 1884, at 215 (discussing Carrie Kilgore’s application and denial to the Penn-
sylvania court and Judge Pierce’s dissent).
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who benefited from and enhanced the developing women’s law reform
network.341
Both cases illustrate how the law reform network and the sociological
jurisprudence arguments were developing.  Goodell wrote her own briefs
employing arguments that included a mix of classical legal reasoning and the
new sociological jurisprudence reasoning.342  She argued, like Bradwell, that
because the new Wisconsin licensing regulations were passed in 1867 and
1870, “when progressive ideas concerning the enlargement of the sphere of
wom[e]n’s industries were more widely known and adopted,” the legislature
intended that women would be eligible for admission.343  She asserted that it
“may reasonably be presumed to have been within the minds of the legislators”
that women could be admitted.344  Goodell also specifically invoked
Bradwell’s case and the Illinois Supreme Court’s rationale denying Bradwell’s
license.345  Distinguishing herself as an unmarried woman, Goodell claimed
that married or not, the Wisconsin legislature had overturned the common law
prohibitions against women’s right to own property, enter into contracts, and
control her own wages, all prohibitions that the Illinois court used to justify
deny Bradwell’s admission.346
Goodell, like the other rights claims activists, advocated for the transition
of gender norms in a period of social ambivalence over the nature and role of
women.347  She addressed the issue directly in her brief, drawing on the two
dominant arguments used by women’s rights activists:  that women were equal
in intelligence and ability to men, and that her natural gender attributes, nurture
and compassion, would enhance her ability to practice law.348  Goodell argued
that “[Woman’s] peculiar delicacy, refinement, and conscientiousness” were
not barriers to women’s participation in the profession, but rather, were “desira-
ble [and] necessary in promoting the ‘proper administration of justice in our
courts.’”349  Simultaneously she argued that, because women comprised half of
the population, the only way to ensure them justice was to ensure that they be
represented by members of their own class.350
The two cases embodied the battle between those justices and legislators
who were trying to maintain a social order based on status, and its attendant
separate gendered spheres, and those law reform activists that advocated a new
social order based on their conception of American liberalism, and its gender-
341 See, e.g., Mrs. Lockwood’s Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 16, 1878, at 70 (explaining
Lockwood wrote a letter to Bradwell pledging to finish the fight Bradwell started to allow
women to practice law and asking for her help in her application to practice law in Mary-
land).  Bradwell published Lockwood’s letter and the details of her case and committed to
support her. Id. See infra for Bradwell’s support of Goodell’s application to practice law in
Wisconsin and Lockwood’s application to practice law before the United States Supreme
Court.
342 See supra notes 183-86.




347 See Cleary, supra note 42, at 243.
348 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 22-23.
349 Can a Woman Practice Law in Wisconsin?, supra note 343.
350 See id.
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neutral construction of citizenship rights.  Bradwell published many of the
arguments of those involved, as well as expressions of public opinion, openly
advocating the position of the activists.  In Goodell’s case, she printed Chief
Justice Ryan’s opinion denying Goodell’s application, along with a reprint of
an article from the Wisconsin State Journal and an editorial by attorney Ole
Mosness criticizing the court’s decision.351  Chief Justice Ryan claimed that
Wisconsin law did not provide for women’s admission to the bar, and follow-
ing Supreme Court Justice Bradley’s concurrence in Bradwell, asserted that
engaging in the practice of law was against women’s nature.352  The Wisconsin
press however, called the decisions unjust and predicted that, “[t]here will be
very decided dissenting opinions expressed by members of the bar and by the
people.”353  The Journal contended that if practicing law would place women’s
purity in danger, “it would be better to reconstruct the court and bar, than to
exclude women.”354
Bradwell also highlighted the sociological jurisprudence arguments of
Lockwood, and her supporters, which occurred at the federal level.355  In 1876,
Belva Lockwood, a licensed and practicing attorney in the District of Colum-
bia, persuaded attorney Albert Riddle to petition for her admission to practice
law before the United States Supreme Court.356  Chief Justice Morrison R.
Waite denied her application, asserting that history and the court rules estab-
lished only men could practice before the highest court.357  Lockwood
responded in accord with the new sociological jurisprudence, that “it was the
glory of each generation to make its own precedents.”358  She also determined
to change the court rules.
Lockwood and her supporters used sociological jurisprudence arguments
in support of the new law she drafted to allow women to be admitted to practice
351 See Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 4, 1876, at 191
(reprinting the Wisconsin State Journal article); see also Mr. Mosness on Judge Ryan’s
Opinion, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 13, 1876, at 271 (printing letter by Mosness to Bradwell
arguing that the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin court’s “prejudice against women in the
practice of law” influenced him to “disregard the plain provision of the statute”).
352 See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 244-45 (1875); see also Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 11, 1876, at 196.
353 Cleary, supra note 42, at 261 (citation omitted).
354 Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, supra note 351.  In 1877 with the support of every
lawyer in her county, Goodell secured a law that prohibited sex as ground for denying a law
license. See Cleary, supra note 42, at 265.
355 See Shall Women Be Admitted to Practice Law in the Federal Courts?, CHI. LEGAL
NEWS, Mar. 23, 1878, at 215; Shall Women Be Admitted to the Bar?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS,
Mar. 30, 1878, at 224; The Admission of Women to the Bar, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb.15,
1879, at 180; Women as Lawyers, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 11, 1878, at 271; Women’s Right
to Practice in the U.S. Courts, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 10, 1877, at 169.
356 See MORELLO, supra note 41, at 31, 33.
357 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 27; 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECON-
STRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 PART ONE, at 1366 (1971); MORELLO, supra note 41, at
33.; see also Jill Norgren, Before it Was Merely Difficult:  Belva Lockwood’s Life in Law
and Politics, 23 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 16, 29 (1999); Lee Ann Potter, A Bill to Relieve
Certain Legal Disabilities of Women, SOC. EDUC., Mar. 2002, at 117, 119.
358 FRANCES A. COOK, WOMEN’S LEGAL HISTORY BIOGRAPHY PROJECT, BELVA ANN LOCK-
WOOD:  FOR PEACE, JUSTICE, AND PRESIDENT, (1997), http://womenslegalhistory.stan-
ford.edu/papers/LockwoodB-Cook97.pdf.
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law before the United States Supreme Court on the same terms as men.  By
1878, with the help of Representative John Montgomery Glover, Lockwood
had secured the passage of her bill in the House of Representatives.359  She
then submitted a brief in support of the bill to the Senate, asserting that the
legislature could and should admit women because the current social conditions
required it.360  “This country is one that has not hesitated when the necessity
has arisen to make precedents . . . ,” she wrote, “[t]he more extended practice
and the more extended public opinion [supporting women lawyers] . . . has
already been accomplished.  Ah!  That very opinion . . . [is] asking you for that
special act now so nearly consummated, which shall open this door of labor to
women.”361  Lockwood next summoned the assistance of California Senator
Aaron Sargent to win the support of the Senate.362
Sargent invoked both the principles of liberalism and the developing soci-
ological jurisprudence arguments in his multiple addresses to Congress promot-
ing the legislation.  He asked members to support the bill and end all
prohibitions on women based on their sex, insisting that women were citizens
with “the same right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and employ-
ment, commensurate with her capacities, as any man has.”363  As evidence, he
listed a number of powerful and accomplished women from history and the
current day, including queens, authors, actors, doctors, and lawyers.364  He later
cited the trend among state legislatures to pass laws prohibiting the use of sex
to exclude women from the bar and the broad national trend toward the social
advancement of women, noting “[i]t is generally recognized that women are
taking themselves a wider sphere of action and filling it well.”365  Finally, he
offered two petitions supporting the bill—the first signed by one hundred and
sixty lawyers from the District of Columbia and the second signed by lawyers
from New York.366  The bill passed thirty-nine to twenty in February 1879.367
Throughout the 1880s, the dominant male bar increasingly accepted the
activists’ campaigns and their sociological jurisprudence arguments for
women’s rights.  Although some state courts continued to resist, one by one,
state and local bars admitted women.368  Carrie Burnham Kilgore’s application
in Pennsylvania illustrates the transition that was taking place both in the law
359 See MORELLO, supra note 41, at 34; see also Mrs. Lockwood’s Victory, CHI. LEGAL
NEWS, Mar. 2, 1878, at 191; Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, supra note 355.
360 See Shall Women Be Admitted to the Bar?, supra note 355.
361 Id.
362 See MORELLO, supra note 41, at 34; Mrs. Lockwood’s Victory, supra note 359.
363 Women as Lawyers, supra note 355.  Throughout Sargent’s political and legal career, he
was a champion of women’s rights.  A close friend of Susan B. Anthony’s, in 1878 he
introduced the “Anthony Amendment” to Congress, the woman suffrage amendment that
was ultimately enacted as the nineteenth amendment in 1920. FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK,
supra note 87, at 165.
364 See Women as Lawyers, supra note 355.
365 The Admission of Women to the Bar, supra note 355.
366 See id.
367 See id.
368 See, e.g., Superior Court of Errors, Conn., CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 21, 1882, at 54
(discussing the court decision and admission of Mary Hall to the Connecticut bar); Women
Lawyers, supra note 339 (discussing the admission of Nettie Cronise Lutes and her sister
Florence Cronise to the Ohio bar).
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and ideology.  In 1874, Judge Biddle and the Pennsylvania board of examiners
refused to even let Kilgore sit for the bar exam.369  Twelve years later, in 1886,
Kilgore overcame Biddle, and those like him, who were still overtly clinging to
divisions based on gender status and the limitations of coverture.370
Her fight wasn’t easy.  In 1884, ten years after her application to take the
bar exam, Kilgore applied to practice law before all four of the Common Court
of Pleas (CCP) in Pennsylvania.371  Only No. 4 admitted her.372  Judge Biddle,
in CCP No. 1, once again voiced his objection to women working in the public
sphere.373  This time however, Kilgore had support.  First, Justice Pierce filed a
dissent, arguing the tenants of liberalism and the changed social circumstances,
which permitted women to hold offices and operate in the public sphere,
required women be allowed to practice law.374  Next, Kilgore persuaded the
Pennsylvania legislature to prohibit sex as a barrier for admission to practice
law.375  Finally, in 1886, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court admitted Kilgore to
its bar.376  Kilgore then returned to CCP No. 1 and demanded Judge Biddle
admit her.377  With “deep disgust,” Biddle acquiesced.378
During the fifteen years since Bradwell had first articulated the sociologi-
cal jurisprudence arguments for why women could be lawyers, the sociological
evidence to support her arguments had grown considerably.  When Bradwell
criticized Biddle and the Pennsylvania Common Court of Pleas for its 1884
ruling, she accused them of maintaining a backward position in a time when
even the United States Supreme Court had advanced its position on the rights
of women.379  “We well remember when the question of admitting women to
the bar was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, for the first
time by writ of error,” Bradwell wrote.380  “But time, an act of Congress, and
public opinion have changed the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and now women are admitted to the bar of that august tribunal upon the
same terms as men.”381  The law activists could not change the minds of judges
like Biddle, but they were slowly, incrementally, able to use the law to over-
come them.
369 See Elizabeth K. Maurer, The Sphere of Carrie Burnham Kilgore, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
827, 833 (1992).
370 See id. at 847.
371 See id. at 842-44.
372 See id. at 844-46.
373 See id. at 844.
374 See id. at 844; Court of Common Please, No. I, Pennsylvania: Mrs. Kilgore Refused
Admission to the Bar, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 22, 1884, at 217.
375 See Maurer, supra note 369, at 847.
376 See id.
377 See id. at 848.
378 Id. (citing A Disgusted Judge:  Mrs. Kilgore Admitted to Practice Law in a Hostile
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1886, at 1).
379 See A Woman Refused Admission to the Bar in Pa., supra note 340.
380 Id.
381 Id.
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Despite these advances, working within the established government insti-
tutions allowed severe limitations on women’s rights to remain in place.382
The law activists, consequently, worked to develop a larger network of support
to advance their law reform campaigns.383  Through the 1880s, women lawyers
often practiced in isolation from each other.  The isolation occurred because
except in places like Chicago and New York, there were only one or two
women lawyers admitted in most states.384  Even with their male advocates,
their small and diffused numbers did not engender them with sufficient power
to enact their broader law reform agenda.  By the end of the decade, therefore,
women lawyers increasingly looked to nongovernmental organizations to gen-
erate the support they needed to secure women’s legal equality.
III. WOMEN LAWYERS AND NGOS
In the late 1880s, women lawyers joined with other women’s rights activ-
ists in an effort to use their social capital as political power to support their law
reform agenda.  They did so by first formalizing their own networks.  Building
on Bradwell’s work, women lawyers began to collect and publish information
on themselves and their work, and then came together—both physically and
virtually—forming networks that amplified their voices.385  Simultaneously,
women lawyers joined other local, national, and transnational women’s rights
associations.  They educated the membership on women’s legal rights and disa-
bilities, set a course of action, mobilized the members to support their agenda,
and then translated their collective energy into a new form of nongovernmental
power.386  Finally, they acted as brokers of this new power, creating pathways
for formerly marginalized women to influence governance.  These efforts
enhanced law activists’ campaigns to incrementally secure women’s rights
through law reforms.
A. Women Lawyers’ Networks and Women’s Associations
As their numbers increased, women lawyers wanted to know about each
other, in part, to dispel persistent, popular arguments that they did not exist.387
They also wanted to draw support from each other and share strategies on how
to overcome the pervasive gender discrimination within the legal profession.388
Finally, they wanted to develop a critical mass to support their law reform
strategy and secure women’s legal equality.389  Although not all women law-
382 See generally CATHERINE WAUGH MCCULLOCH, ILLINOIS LAWS CONCERNING WOMEN
(1907) (outlining the rights women gained through law reforms, but also describing the
difficulties of enforcing those rights and the inequality of rights that persisted).
383 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 70-71.
384 See generally Robinson, supra note 164.
385 See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 47, at 45-46.
386 See id. at 55; Infra Part III.A.
387 See Robinson, supra note 164, at 10.
388 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 11-14.
389 Myra Bradwell’s publications in her Chicago Legal News on women’s rights issues, and
especially the work and efforts of women’s lawyers in particular, are the most dramatic
examples of efforts to create a critical mass of support for women’s rights. See Goddard,
supra note 44, at 112-14 (asserting that Bradwell used her Chicago Legal News to gain
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yers were law activists, during the nineteenth century, most supported their
efforts to secure women’s civil and political rights.
In the 1880s, a number of women lawyers joined Myra Bradwell’s efforts
to gather and disseminate information on legal issues affecting women and on
every female attorney in the United States and beyond.  For example, in 1886,
Catherine Waite, a long-time activist and colleague of Bradwell’s, founded a
new legal magazine, the Chicago Law Times, that she used to promote the
cause of women’s rights and the cause and work of women lawyers.390  In
1887, Waite published an article by Ellen Martin, a Chicago lawyer, that docu-
mented the numbers and status of women lawyers throughout the country.391
Martin lamented that women lawyers were “widely scattered,” but used their
existence and experiences as evidence that male lawyers were no longer
opposed to women’s admission and practice in the profession.392  Through the
next decade and into the twentieth century, women lawyers continued to count,
list, and celebrate their growing numbers.393
There were others that exaggerated the import and influence of women
lawyers with an aim towards bringing them together.  For example, in 1888,
Ada Bittenbender, a lawyer in Nebraska, wrote about the accomplishments of
women lawyers and their milestones in the United States and throughout the
world.394  She posited that women lawyers had moved beyond the fight for
admission and had secured positions of power within the legal system.395  She
also highlighted the two newly established women lawyer associations: the
Equity Club and the Women’s Inter-National Bar Association.396  Without an
overt appeal, Bittenbender (who was a member of both)397 encouraged the
others to join together.
The Equity Club was one of the first formal organizations of women law-
yers.398  Founded in 1886 by seven women students and graduates of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, the Club served as a centralized
correspondence for women lawyers locally, nationally, and transnationally.399
As Virginia Drachman explains, the Club gave women lawyers and law stu-
dents a means to “transcend the geographic distance that separated them and to
professional and popular support for women’s equality through law reforms); see also Ada
M. Bittenbender, Woman in Law, 2 CHI. L. TIMES 301, 305 (1888) (discussing that the
purposes of the Woman’s International Bar Association included “disseminat[ing] knowl-
edge concerning women’s legal status [and] secur[ing] better legal conditions for women”).
390 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 270.
391 See generally Martin, supra note 164.
392 Id. at 86-87; see also MORELLO, supra note 41, at 37-38.
393 Can Women Practice Law?, 1 L. STUDENT’S HELPER 102, 102-103 (1893); see also
INEZ HAYNES IRWIN, ANGELS AND AMAZONS:  A HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN WOMEN
172-80 (1933); Robinson, supra note 164, at 10; Edith Prouty, Women in the Law:  Their
Past, Present and Future, WOMAN’S J., Apr. 22, 1876.
394 See generally Bittenbender, supra note 389.
395 See id. at 309.
396 See id. at 305.
397 See id. See generally DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 135, 205.
398 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW supra note 42, at 66.
399 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 1; Bittenbender, supra note 389,
at 305.
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build a community of women.”400  They also began to form their own commit-
tees within larger women’s associations, including within one of the first trans-
national women’s associations, the International Council of Women (ICW).401
The ICW was the formalization of a movement initiated in the early 1880s
by women suffragists in Great Britain, France, and the United States, most
prominently Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, with a goal to join
together women in the campaign for political equality.402  To meet that end, the
U. S. National Woman Suffrage Association in 1888 sponsored an international
woman’s conference in Washington, D. C.403  Catharine Waugh (McCulloch),
a newly admitted woman lawyer from Illinois and a longtime women’s rights
activist, shared information about the meeting with other women lawyers
through a letter to the Equity Club.404  Waugh sought to situate it within the
living history of the women’s rights movement:
All the good women, the brilliant, the philanthropic, the noted that we had ever heard
of seemed to be there, except those that were dead, and as for them, I do believe
those dear old saints who worked so hard, long years ago, were present in spirit,
looking down on us with great joy, that their daughters had so nearly approached
their long hoped for goal.405
The women at the conference established the International Council of
Women, an entity intended to be a parent organization to National Councils
that it hoped women would establish in their individual countries.406
The ICW immediately invoked law as its primary strategy to secure
women’s emancipation.407  Ardent suffragists and radical activists, as Leila
Rupp explains, criticized the ICW for maintaining this conservative approach
to attain women’s rights.408  But its lawyer members believed it could affect
root change for women.  At its founding conference ICW members discussed
women’s legal inequality as a wrong “common to all races and nations.”409
The consensus of the Council was that the best course to alleviate these wrongs
was for women themselves to establish laws and oversee their implementa-
tion.410  The ICW’s lawyer members quickly helped the organization develop
an agenda of transnational law reform.
At the inaugural meeting, some of the lawyer attendees formed the
Woman’s Inter-National Bar Association (WIBA), establishing a foundation
for a nongovernmental network that would create new avenues of influence for
400 DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 2.




404 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 133-37.
405 Id. at 134.
406 See RUPP, supra note 401, at 15.
407 See id.
408 See id. at 19.
409 Leila J. Rupp, Constructing Internationalism:  The Case of Transnational Women’s
Organizations, 1888-1945, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1571, 1585 (1994).
410 See WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD:  THE DYNAMIC STORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL OF WOMEN SINCE 1888, at 22-23 (1966).
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women.411  The WIBA delegates established an agenda with four broad goals
by the end of the conference.412  The first two, to “open law schools to women”
and “to remove all disabilities to admission of women to the bar, and to secure
their eligibility to the bench[,]” were intended to increase women’s presence
and standing within the legal profession.413  The second two goals, “[t]o dis-
seminate knowledge concerning woman’s legal status” and “secure better legal
conditions for women,” sought to use information about women’s legal ine-
quality to effect reforms in the social and legal rights of all women.414  The
intent of the WIBA was to use this international forum to pressure national
governments to reform their own laws, systems, and institutions.415  As Keck
and Sikkink explain, transnational advocacy networks provided “alternative
channels of communication [for v]oices that are suppressed in their own socie-
ties . . . [and] can project and amplify their concerns into an international arena,
which in turn can echo back into their own countries.”416
During the 1890s, law activists increasingly used the strategy of informa-
tion politics, the method of reporting facts and motivating action—through
local, national, and transnational advocacy networks.417  They continued to
publish articles about women lawyers with aims to increase their network,
advance public awareness of their growing numbers and status, and win support
for their cause.418  One of these articles reported the results of a study by Leila
Robinson, a Massachusetts lawyer who tried for twelve years, to locate every
woman lawyer in the United States.419  Robinson explained that her project was
necessary to overcome the prevalent misleading information that women law-
yers were as real as “sea-serpents.”420  She attempted to unite women lawyers
together in their cause by describing them, and herself, as “[s]isters in . . .
law.”421  Additionally, in 1893 through a variety of forums that all converged at
the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago, women lawyers attempted to
use their networks and information politics to influence reform and advance
women’s rights.422
B. Women Lawyers and the World’s Columbian Exposition
During the World’s Columbian Exposition,423 transnational advocacy net-
works of women lawyers advocated for women’s legal equality in three sepa-
rate venues.  The first involved women lawyers working with other women
411 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 135-36.
412 See id. at 132-33; Bittenbender, supra note 389, at 305.
413 DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 132.
414 Id. at 133.
415 See WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 410, at 3.
416 KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 47, at x.
417 See id. at 45-46.
418 See Bittenbender, supra note 389, at 305; Goddard, supra note 44, at 112-14. See gen-
erally Robinson, supra note 164.
419 See Robinson, supra note 164, at 10.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 See infra Part III.B.
423 See generally Robert W. Rydell, World’s Columbian Exposition, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CHICAGO, 898, 898-902 (James R. Grossman et al. eds., 2004).
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professionals to advance women’s position within the learned professions and
to garner support for their law reform strategy to secure full emancipation and
equality for all women.424  The second venue involved women lawyers work-
ing within the single-sex ICW to use the social capital of the Council and its
members to create a new form of power and influence for women to secure
equal rights across the globe.425  The third venue involved women lawyers
working within the established legal and political institutions, representing
women’s interests and serving as a bridge to provide other activists an avenue
into those institutions.426  This three-tiered strategy modeled the approach law
activists followed throughout the twentieth century.
The first of the three organized activities was a separatist conference.427  It
evolved out of the protests Myra Bradwell led in the fall of 1889 against the
exclusion of women from the organizational activities of the Exposition.428
Over 2000 women, including many of the women lawyers and doctors in Chi-
cago, joined Bradwell in her demand that a Women’s Department be created to
ensure the inclusion of women’s work at the Exposition.429  But during the
campaign to establish a Women’s Department, the women activists split into
two factions.430  One faction, led by Bertha Palmer, wanted to create a
women’s exposition that would focus only on women’s industries, artistic
endeavors, and charities.431  The second faction, comprised of women profes-
sionals and equal rights activists, wanted to use the exposition to highlight all
of women’s achievements and political aspirations.432
The women professionals and activists organized as the Queen Isabella
Association (QIA) (honoring the woman who made Columbus’ voyage possi-
ble) and engaged in extensive campaigns to ensure all of women’s accomplish-
ments and their political agenda would be included in the fair.433  They even
published a journal to advance their position.434  But Palmer’s faction won con-
trol of the Board of Lady Managers,435 and in 1892, officially declined the
QIA’s application for space on the fairgrounds.436  In response, the QIA
secured a clubhouse two blocks from the fairgrounds, established separate med-
ical and law departments, and prepared to provide a forum during the Exposi-
tion for professional women and women’s rights campaigns.437
The QIA law department used the opportunity to advance the development
of a national network of women lawyers.  It sponsored a conference specifi-
424 See JEANNE MADELINE WEIMANN, THE FAIR WOMEN 28 (1981).
425 See THE WORLD’S CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVE WOMEN, at xix-xxiv (May Wright
Sewall ed., 1894).
426 See Women in the Law Reform Congress, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 12, 1893, at 435.
427 See WEIMANN, supra note 424, at 26-27.
428 See id.
429 See id. at 27.
430 See infra notes 431-32.
431 See also WEIMANN, supra note 424, at 30. See generally Margo Hobbs Thompson,
Palmer, Bertha Honore´, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO, supra note 44, at 661, 661-62.
432 See WEIMANN, supra note 424, at 28-30, 58.
433 See id. at 30.
434 See id. at 59-60.
435 See id. at 40-43.
436 See id. at 66.
437 See id. at  67.
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cally for women lawyers that occurred during the Exposition.438  The goals for
the conference were twofold:  to provide a forum to promote camaraderie
among women lawyers and to advance their political agenda.439  The lawyers
acknowledged that they had a different agenda from many women’s associa-
tions, yet, they sought to ensure that they would not be excluded from future
important events or organizations.440  “[Women lawyers] should have some
kind of organization,” Ellen Martin, the chair of the law department, explained,
“so that they could control their representation in the general organizations of
women.”441
For three days in August 1893, women lawyers strengthened their network
and crystallized their mission for women’s equality through law reform.442  Fif-
teen of the most prominent women lawyers from the United States spoke on a
variety of legal topics.443  Their themes focused on campaigns to attain political
equality, efforts to challenge laws that excluded or limited the rights of women,
and strategies to enhance their work as lawyers in the profession.444  They also
recounted the history of women’s efforts to enter into the legal profession.445
The women wanted to ensure that their fight to break through gender barriers
over the past twenty years was recorded and remembered by future generations
as they continued the fight.446  The presenters included Arabella Mansfield,
Ada Kepley, and Carrie Burnham Kilgore.447  Ellen Martin delivered Myra
Bradwell’s address, as Bradwell was too ill with cancer to attend.448  The law
department ended its conference by founding the National League of Women
Lawyers, an organization intended to provide United States women lawyers a
means of helping one another in their legal practice.449
The second activity women lawyers organized occurred under the official
auspices of the Exposition.450  The Women’s Auxiliary invited the National
Council of Women (NCW), the United States branch of the ICW, to hold the
ICW’s first quinquennial meeting as part of the Exposition.451  The stated
438 See Legal Department Queen Isabella Association, QUEEN ISABELLA J. 4 (1892); see
also Women Lawyers at the Isabella Club House, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 12, 1893, at 451.
See generally Program, Queen Isabella Association Law Department Meeting of Women
Lawyers, August 3rd, 4th and 5th, 1893, in Queen Isabella Association Papers (on file with
the Chicago History Museum) [hereinafter Program, Queen Isabella Association].
439 See Women Lawyers at the Isabella Club House, supra note 438.
440 See generally id.
441 Id.
442 See id.
443 See generally Program, Queen Isabella Association, supra note 438.
444 See Women Lawyers at the Isabella Club House, supra note 438.
445 See id.
446 See generally id.
447 See Program, Queen Isabella Association, supra note 438.
448 See James B. Bradwell, Women Lawyers of Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 2, 1900, at
339.  The other speakers in this session included an introduction by Ohio lawyer Florence
Cronise, and a speech Women Lawyers in Ancient Times by Massachusetts lawyer Mary A.
Green. See Program, Queen Isabella Association, supra note 438.  Thirty women lawyers
attended the meeting. Women Lawyers of Illinois, supra; see also Program, Queen Isabella
Association, supra note 438.
449 See Women Lawyers at the Isabella Club House, supra note 438.
450 See THE WORLD’S CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVE WOMEN, supra note 425, at xix.
451 See id.
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objective of the weeklong conference, “Congress of Representative Women,”
was to provide a forum where “the progress of women, in all lands and in all
departments of human progress,” could be presented.452  One of its main
themes was the need for legal reforms at local and national levels to grant
women political rights in a movement toward political equality.453  The NCW
President, May Wright Sewall, used the forum to promote her vision of cohe-
sive gender equality, “not for divided womanhood as against a separate man-
hood, but a new march for a unified, harmonious, onstepping humanity[.]”454
Sewell’s remarks exemplified the strategy of the Congress:  ICW mem-
bers, both activists and lawyers, attempted to use the international forum to
identify central values and reframe the debates, with the hope that their pres-
sure for reform would reflect back into their individual countries.455  For exam-
ple, Florence Fenwick Miller, a member of the Woman’s Franchise League of
England, identified goals that her organization had in common with the other
organizations represented.456  She described the Franchise League’s law reform
campaigns to secure women’s equal treatment and rights in divorce actions,
equality in the intestate inheritance of property, and the parliamentary vote.457
Miller sought to unite the international audience in support of those campaigns,
urging:  “Let us take a firm ground on equality, and see that the laws between
men and women shall be made equal.”458  Miller further emphasized the need
for international pressure to change national laws because there was little sup-
port for the campaigns at home.459  J. Ellen Foster, a lawyer in Washington,
D.C., also advocated for equality of rights by focusing on values men and
women shared.460  Foster minimized the differences between the sexes and
instead emphasized the ideals of liberty and the commonality of humanity.461
Women lawyers also participated in the Congress of Women events that
were sponsored by the Woman’s Auxiliary (and not part of the ICW), further
disseminating information on the growing numbers of women lawyers through-
out the world, their work, and the critical role they played in the efforts to
secure rights and justice for women.462  Ada Bittenbender contributed an article
to The National Exposition Souvenir documenting the long history of women
learned in the law and the challenges and accomplishments of women lawyers
to her current day.463  Charlotte Holt delivered an address on women’s rights
and on the role of women and their place in the profession at a congress in the
452 Id. at xxii.
453 See id.
454 Id. at 18.
455 See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 47, at x.
456 See THE WORLD’S CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVE WOMEN, supra note 425, at 20-22.
457 See id.  New York activist Lillie Devereux Blake and Kansan Eugenia T. St. John simi-
larly discussed rights claims efforts in their states. See id. at 430-32, 445.
458 Id. at 424.  This quote is from a second address Miller gave at the Congress entitled
Work of the Franchise League. Id. at 420.
459 See id. at 20-22.
460 See id. at 439-45.
461 See id.
462 See WEIMANN, supra note 424, at 545 (illustrating the series of small congresses that
were organized by Mary Eagle and held in the Woman’s Building in May 1893).
463 Ada M. Bittenbender, Women in Law, in THE NATIONAL EXPOSITION SOUVENIR:  WHAT
AMERICA OWES TO WOMEN 390, 390 (Lydia Hoyt Farmer ed., 1893).
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Woman’s Building.464  Holt, who had devoted the previous seven years to run-
ning a women’s legal aid society in Chicago, urged that the greatest quality a
woman could possess was “the spirit of justice.”465  Holt also proposed that the
efforts and accomplishments of women lawyers be judged not by the male stan-
dard of measuring monetary reward or prestige, but by the daily work that a
woman lawyer does.466
The third organized activity of women lawyers during the 1893 Exposition
involved a direct intervention with the male bar.  As their own conference illus-
trated, the issues of advancing women’s social and legal position were intri-
cately intertwined with their goal of advancing women’s position within the
legal profession.  Within the women’s movement, from the local level to the
international, women lawyers continued to lead rights claims campaigns to
secure women’s full emancipation as they continued to fight to establish them-
selves as respected members of the bar.467  Their work to both mobilize
women’s rights activists and reach and influence legal and political institutions
depended on their integration into the system.  Women lawyers, therefore,
demanded that they be included in the Exposition’s official Congress on Juris-
prudence and Law Reform.468
The women lawyers infiltrated the Law Congress in stages with the criti-
cal help of key male supporters, including Myra Bradwell’s husband.  James
Bradwell was one of the eighteen men who comprised the auxiliary in charge
of determining the composition of the Congress.469  Myra Bradwell served as
chair of the committee, while their daughter Bessie Bradwell Helmer, who was
also a lawyer, served as vice chair, and Catharine Waugh McCulloch served as
a member.470  The women’s law committee rejected the idea of holding a sepa-
rate women’s congress on law reform and demanded that they be included in
the official law congress.471  Myra Bradwell explained that though a separate
women’s congress would have allowed them more control of their program,
“after mature deliberation, the woman’s committee concluded that the interests
of women in the profession of law would be best conserved by a joint con-
gress.”472  After lengthy debate, the joint committee invited thirty-five men and
four women to present papers at the four-day Congress.473
The women’s committee used the Congress to project the voices and con-
cerns of the transnational women’s rights networks into the international public
arena.  They invited Eliza Orme, a lawyer from England, Cornelia Sorabji, a
lawyer from India, and Mary Greene and Clara Foltz, both lawyers from the
464 See Charlotte C. Holt, The Woman Who Has Come, in THE CONGRESS OF WOMEN 190,
190-92 (Mary Kavanaugh Oldham Eagle ed., 1894).
465 Id. at 192.
466 See id. at 191.
467 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 21.
468 See Women in the Law Reform Congress, supra note 426.
469 See The Courts, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 12, 1893, at 427.
470 See id.
471 See Women in the Law Reform Congress, supra note 426.
472 Id.
473 See id.; see also World’s Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, CHI. LEGAL
NEWS, Aug. 5, 1893, at 425 (listing the revised program of speakers).
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United States, to present papers at the law reform congress.474  Each presenter
discussed their country’s laws and social customs that restricted women’s right
to work, control their wages, and participate in governance.475  Each also advo-
cated for law reforms that would secure women’s full emancipation and ensure
them equal rights and treatment before the law.476  The committee and the
speakers used the international forum to disseminate information about the
injustices in individual countries and their reform efforts to advance women’s
rights and secure women’s equality.
In many ways, the World’s Columbian Exposition marked the passing of
leadership of the women’s law reform movement in Illinois from Myra
Bradwell to Catharine Waugh McCulloch.  Ellen Carol DuBois perceptively
identified the strategic similarity between Bradwell’s 1870 New Departure
arguments and Catharine McCulloch’s 1913 argument that the United States
Constitution allowed the Illinois legislature to grant women the vote in presi-
dential elections.477  But DuBois incorrectly assessed that the incidents stood in
isolation from each other.478  By shifting the focus from the woman suffrage
movement to the campaigns of law activists, this Article reveals the continuity
between the two events.479  From the 1860s to the 1890s, Myra Bradwell and a
cadre of law activists insisted that women were citizens, entitled to full citizen-
ship rights and obligations.  They employed a strategy of law reform to incre-
mentally secure women’s rights in an effort to secure women’s legal equality.
Catharine Waugh McCulloch led that effort into the middle of the twentieth
century, perpetuating the model law activists employed through the rest of the
century.
IV. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LEGACY OF THE WOMEN’S LAW
REFORM MOVEMENT
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Catharine Waugh McCulloch
and a select group of women lawyers emerged as the next leaders of the law
reform movement.  As the new century ushered in a new generation of women
lawyers, the law activists carried the movement forward.  Although women
remained a very small percentage of the legal profession until the last quarter of
the twentieth century, their numbers increased dramatically from their begin-
nings, especially in industrialized, urban centers, such as Chicago.480  The
reform efforts of nineteenth-century activists that secured women’s civil right
to work and own property allowed some of the new women lawyers—and
474 See World’s Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, supra note 473; see also
Barbara Allen Babcock, Women Defenders in the West, 1 NEV. L.J. 1, 18 (2001).
475 See The Courts, supra note 469.
476 See id.
477 See DuBois, supra note 24, at 34, 39 n.52; see also BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 176-78
(describing McCulloch’s role as a leader in the Illinois suffrage movement and her author-
ship of the Illinois woman suffrage bill enacted in 1913).
478 See DuBois, supra note 24, at 34.
479 See supra note 477.
480 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 253 tbl.2; BAR NONE:  125 YEARS OF
WOMEN LAWYERS IN ILLINOIS 32-33 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee ed., 1998) (listing the first 101
women lawyers in Illinois by 1900).
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many more as the century progressed—to concentrate on their careers, rather
than engage in reform activities.  But because the legal and political systems
continued to systematically discriminate against women,481 even the most dedi-
cated practitioner supported the work of the activists and the advancement of
women’s social, civil, and political rights.
This section briefly outlines the legacy of the women’s law reform move-
ment.  It argues that the three-prong strategy law activists developed in the
nineteenth century formed the model twentieth-century law activists imple-
mented in their continued efforts for legal equality.  This strategy involved:  1)
the enactment of positive laws and the development of new modes of judicial
interpretation; 2) the continued infiltration and influence of women in the legal
profession; and 3) the collaboration of law activists with local, national, and
international NGOs to enhance their voice within the systems of governance.
The core of these strategies persisted as each generation modified and adjusted
their efforts based on new social and political exigencies.  By the end of the
twentieth century, the movement nearly secured women’s formal equality, but
women’s substantive equality remained elusive.
A. Legacy of Positive Law and Judicial Interpretation Campaigns
Catharine Waugh McCulloch advocated for the enactment of a plethora of
positive laws during her fifty-year tenure as a leader in the law reform move-
ment.482  Like her predecessors, she believed that through the enactment of
positive laws, women would secure legal and substantive equality.483  McCul-
loch earned her law license in 1886 and worked with many of the founders of
the law reform movement, including Catharine Waite and Myra Bradwell.484
But McCulloch was a generation younger than the pioneers.  She did not have
to fight to attend law school or to receive her law license, yet she did struggle
to earn a living in her chosen profession.485  She therefore continued the move-
ment, but adapted it, allowing it to transition into the new age.
481 See DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 215-24 (arguing that experiences of
sex discrimination discouraged women lawyers who had hoped they would succeed in the
profession because of their merit).
482 See id. at 253 (outlining McCulloch’s legislative efforts for women’s guardianship
rights, raising the age of consent, and woman suffrage); Mary Linehan, McCulloch, Catha-
rine Gouger Waugh, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO, supra note 44, at 560, 560-62 (outlin-
ing McCulloch’s efforts for woman suffrage, mother’s custody rights, and raising the age of
consent).
483 See Linehan, supra note 482, at 560-62; see also CATHARINE WAUGH MCCULLOCH,
CHRONOLOGY OF THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN ILLINOIS 1-4 (1912) (detailing the
legislative enactments that were moving women towards legal equality).
484 See DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 42, at 251-53 (for description of McCul-
loch’s law school and graduation and her relationship with Catharine Waite); The Courts,
supra note 469 (documenting that Bradwell and McCulloch worked together on the Commit-
tee of the Woman’s Branch of the World’s Congress Auxiliary on Jurisprudence and Law);
see also Catharine Waugh McCulloch McCulloch, Myra Bradwell 7 (unpublished biographi-
cal sketch, on file with Grace H. Harte, Series III of the Mary Earhart Dillon Collection,
1890-1945, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) (noting that she and
Mary Ahrens were “two of [Bradwell’s] sister lawyers” who sat on the committee of the
Chicago Bar Association formed to honor Myra Bradwell after her death).
485 See Linehan, supra note 482, at 560.
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The Progressive Era had spawned a diverse group of reformers engaged in
overlapping and sometimes contradictory efforts.486  McCulloch and the other
law activists sought to use the social and political capital of these groups to
enact and enforce positive laws that advanced the rights of women.487  They
continued the strategy of infiltrating these various associations and developed
an educational component.  They determined to both educate a broad base of
women on their legal rights and to inform and persuade men and women to
support their reforms.488  The Chicago Woman’s Club (CWC), the most pres-
tigious and powerful woman’s club in the city, was one of the first of the
groups they infiltrated.489
The law activists persuaded the CWC to establish the Chicago Political
Equality League (CPEL) as an affiliate association.490  Its purpose, “to promote
the study of political science and government and foster and extend the political
rights and privileges of women,” enabled the activists to pursue their dual
objectives of education and law reform.491  They gave free public lectures and
held courses on women’s legal rights and practical legal matters.492  They also
advocated a wide-range of positive laws that sought women’s equal right to
suffrage, education, divorce, and compensation.493  Their efforts won the sup-
port of a vast number of club women throughout the city.494
486 See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 142, at 202-03 (arguing that in the first decades of the
twentieth century there emerged a mass movement of diverse groups that converged to sup-
port woman suffrage).
487 See, e.g., Grace Wilbur Trout, Early League History, in CHICAGO POLITICAL EQUALITY
LEAGUE ANNUAL 1895-1911, 58-59 (1911) (describing the work of McCulloch, lawyer
Charlotte Holt, and lawyer Ellen Martin in persuading the Chicago Woman’s Club to assist
in founding the Chicago Political Equality League and the establishment of its Legislative
Committee).
488 For example, in 1877 Bradwell joined with a number of women and men already work-
ing for social and legal reforms, most prominently Frances Willard, the leader of the Illinois
Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), and Elizabeth Boyton Harbert, president of
the IWSA, to found the Illinois Social Science Association (ISSA).  The objective of the
ISSA was to identify social problems and develop social and legal reforms to address those
problems.  The women’s rights activists within the mixed-sex organization persuaded the
organization to support reforms that advanced women’s rights, including woman suffrage.
See BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 122-23.
489 See id. at 163.
490 See Trout, supra note 487, at 58.
491 Id. at 58-59.
492 See id.
493 See Legal Status of Women—Questions to Be Answered at the February Meeting, in
CHICAGO POLITICAL EQUALITY LEAGUE ANNUAL, supra note 487, 9-11; see also BUECHLER,
supra note 90, at 162-66; MCCULLOCH, supra note 483, at 1-4 (listing the law reforms
Illinois women’s rights activists secured including:  the first married women’s property act
(1861); the second, which allowed a married woman to control her own wages (1869); the
third, which abolished curtesy and established a dower right for each spouse (1874);
women’s right to work in all occupations and professions (1872); women’s right to hold
school offices (1873); women’s right to be Notaries Public (1875); a raise in the age a girl
was deemed competent to consent to sexual intercourse from ten to fourteen years (1887);
the right to vote in school elections (1891); a prohibition on child labor (1891); right to joint
guardianship of children (1901); and a second raise in the age of consent to sixteen years
(1905)).
494 See Trout, supra note 487, at 58-62.
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Law activists in Illinois and throughout the country also established their
own institutions.  In 1911, the New York City Women Lawyers’ Club (estab-
lished in 1899) transformed itself into the National Association of Women
Lawyers.495  It published the Women Lawyers’ Journal (WLJ) and urged
women lawyers in other cities to join.496  The WLJ enhanced the efforts of the
Chicago Legal News, by both disseminating information on women lawyers
throughout the world and reporting on legal issues affecting women.497
Women lawyers in other cities began to form local associations and joined the
NAWL as affiliates.498  In 1914, nine women lawyers in Chicago established
the Women’s Bar Association of Illinois (WBAI).499  Its two-fold mission, like
its parent organization, was to advance the interests of women lawyers and the
women’s law reform movement.500
Catharine Waugh McCulloch became president of the WBAI in 1916 dur-
ing its formative years.501  She held the office for four years, shaping the asso-
ciation in the law activist tradition.502  The WBAI maintained its own active
law reform agenda, which initially included the Nineteenth Amendment, a Pub-
lic Defender League for Girls (to protect the rights of girls who were subject to
the Morals court), women jury service, and the eight-hour day.503  It supported
women’s campaigns for judicial and political, elected and appointed offices.504
The WBAI worked with other associations to advance women’s rights as its
members also worked inside other local and national associations.505
The League of Women Voters was one of these associations.506  After
women secured full suffrage through the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, the
National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) became the
National League of Women Voters (NLWV) to ensure that women capitalized
on their right to vote and continued to advance law reforms.507  Women law-
yers joined NLWV and its local branches and immediately established its Com-
mittee on Uniform Laws Concerning Women, to advance a law reform
495 See Selma Moidel Smith, A Century of Achievement:  The Centennial of the National
Association of Women Lawyers, 85 WOMEN LAW. J. 18 (1999).
496 See id. at 19.
497 See A. Florence Joyce, “How We Started”, in 75 YEAR HISTORY OF NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF WOMEN LAWYERS 1899-1974, at 13, 15 (Mary H. Zimmerman ed., 1975).
498 See id. at 13-14.
499 See Adelman, supra note 292, at 425.
500 See id.; Laura Miller Derry, Historiette of NAWL, in 75 YEAR HISTORY, supra note 497,
at 23, 23.
501 See CHARLOTTE ADELMAN, WBAI 75:  THE FIRST 75 YEARS 13 (1992).
502 Catharine Waugh McCulloch 5 (unpublished biographical sketch, on file with Grace H.
Harte, Series III of the Mary Earhart Dillon Collection, 1890-1945, Schlesinger Library,
Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
503 See Adelman, supra note 292, at 425-26.
504 See id. at 426-27.
505 See Grace H. Harte, A Momentous Victory, 25 WOMEN LAW. J. 54, 54 (1939) (describ-
ing the way the WBAI worked with the Federation of Women’s Clubs, League of Women
Voters, Parent-Teachers Congress, and the Business and Professional Women club on the
issue of women jury service).
506 Id.
507 See BUECHLER, supra note 90, at 182.
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agenda.508  McCulloch chaired the national committee and set a legislative
platform for state chapters to pursue issues that included:  equal guardianship
rights, higher age of consent laws, the right for woman to control her own
wages and property, and women’s jury service.509  In Illinois, the LWV’s local
branches worked with the WBAI to finally secure women’s jury service in
1939.510
Both the WBAI and the NAWL were initially ambivalent on the issues that
divided the women’s rights movement during this time.  There was a well-
documented split between the advocates of protective labor legislation enacted
to ease the physical and financial abuse of working women and children, and
the advocates of the 1923 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), proposed to estab-
lish women’s formal legal equality with men.511  Law activists consistently
advocated for women’s substantive equality.512  During the early part of the
twentieth century, they supported the protective labor legislation laws without
repudiating the concept of equal rights.513  By the late 1930s, after the enact-
ment of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), law activists began to argue that
protective labor legislation was no longer necessary.514  Some supported Alice
Paul’s 1923 ERA, while others argued for an alternative Equal Rights Amend-
ment, hoping it would secure substantive equality for women.515  But regard-
less of their position on the ERA, they continued to work together for other law
reforms to advance women’s rights.516
The law reforms for which NAWL, its state branches, and other law activ-
ists advocated throughout the second half of the twentieth century continued
the work of their predecessors.  They focused much of their efforts on women’s
508 See Paul S. Boyer, McCulloch, Catharine Gouger Waugh, in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, supra note 44, at 459.
509 See Letter from Catharine Waugh McCulloch to Mary Sumner Boyd (June 1, 1920) (on
file with Catharine Waugh McCulloch, Series VI of the Mary Earhart Dillon Collection,
1869-1945, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
510 See Harte, supra note 505, at 54 (arguing that the Women’s Bar Association of Illinois
(WBAI) was the leader in the women jury bill campaign).
511 See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX:  THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES
1945-1968, at 9-11 (1988); see also Becker, supra note 17, at 210.
512 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 495, at 20 (arguing that NAWL members fought for “equal-
ity of justice for women”).
513 See Presidents Report, Women’s Bar Association of Illinois (1936-37), Papers Box 7 file
3 (discussing WBAI’s rejection of NAWL’s position in favor of the ERA).
514 See generally Smith, supra note 495, at 21-22 (arguing that NAWL opposed protective
labor legislation as early as 1927 and throughout the 1930s); Helen Hunt West, Nat’l Ass’n
of Women Lawyers, Speech Given before the Resolutions Committee–Democratic Party
Chicago, Illinois (July 12, 1940) (arguing that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment will
protect women workers).
515 See Presidents Report, supra note 513 (discussing WBAI’s rejection of NAWL’s posi-
tion in favor of the ERA); see also Grace H. Harte, Notes of the Women’s Bar Association,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 11, 1941 (outlining her proposed alternative ERA, which she
modeled after the English Sex Discrimination Act).  This was distinct from the Taft-Wad-
sworth Bill proposed by ERA opponents in 1947. See also HARRISON, supra note 511, at
26-29 (explaining the Taft-Wadsworth bill).
516 Grace H. Harte, Notes of the Women’s Bar Association, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 22,
1941 (noting that members of the WBAI were elected as officers in the NWLA and that they
continued to work on law reforms regarding women’s rights in marriage and divorce.).
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rights in marriage and work.  NAWL, in particular, fought for new divorce laws
that vastly expanded the grounds for divorce, abolishing the necessity of
fault.517  It worked through the American Bar Association (ABA) for almost a
quarter century to create the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.518  NAWL
also joined the fight for the enactment of the 1963 Equal Pay Act, which pro-
hibited employers from paying women less than men because of their sex, and
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which banned sex discrimination by
employers with more than twenty-five employees.519  One of its past presi-
dents, Marguerite Rawalt, became a leader in securing women’s legal equality,
a federal effort that laid the foundation for the second wave of the women’s
movement.520
In the 1960s, a small group of law activists led a renewed campaign to
secure women’s legal equality through federal statutes, United States constitu-
tional provisions, and federal judicial decisions.  Three lawyers, Rawalt, Pauli
Murray, and Esther Peterson, a labor activist, were at the core of this effort.521
They served together on the Presidential Commission on the Status of
Women’s (PCSW) and Committee on Civil and Political Rights.522  Rawalt
advocated using the legislature and the enactment of the ERA as the best means
to secure legal equality.523  Murray advocated using the courts and a judicial
reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.524  They both supported Title
VII and worked together for its enactment and for its subsequent enforcement
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).525
By the 1970s there was a unified women’s rights movement committed to
the law reform strategy.526  Most activists who had previously opposed the
ERA changed their position.527  Law activists who had been divided over
whether to pursue women’s equality through the ERA or the Fourteenth
Amendment agreed to pursue both.528  During this era, feminists established a
number of new organizations, including the National Organization of Women
(NOW).529  This organization, like many others, quickly established a law
reform agenda and soon supported the ERA and a strategy of litigation based
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.530  The
Women’s Liberation movement was underway.
517 See HARRISON, supra note 511, at 28.
518 See id.
519 See id.; Becker, supra note 17, at 233-35; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -16 (2006).
520 See Becker, supra note 17, at 210, 216; Smith, supra note 495, at 28.
521 See Becker, supra note 17, at 216.
522 See id. at 216, 221-22.
523 See id. at 218-19.
524 See id. at 222.
525 See id. at 234-35.
526 See id. at 210.
527 See id. at 211-51, for a detailed account of the transformation. But see id. at 241-42
(describing how some radical feminists, who refused to oppose the ERA, nonetheless main-
tained that it would not result in substantive equality).
528 See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices:  Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynam-
ics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755, 758 (2004).
529 See HARRISON, supra note 511, at 192.
530 See Mayeri, supra note 528, at 785-92, 794-96.
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The account of women’s law reform activities from the 1970s through the
end of the twentieth century is much more familiar.  State legislatures and Con-
gress enacted an abundance of laws intended to achieve formal and legal equal-
ity.531  In some cases, the Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause
to strike down laws that discriminated on the basis of sex.532  But Supreme
Court Justices disagreed on the level of scrutiny the Court should apply in such
cases, and the strategy failed to yield the legal equality law activists hoped it
would.533  Most scholars assess that during the last quarter of the twentieth
century, the legal content of equality became “formalistic, exclusive, and
impoverished,” privileging white, upper-class women over working-class
women and women of color.534  Others suggest, even with the changes, the law
remained “male,” continuing to discriminate against all women.535  Law activ-
ists therefore sustained their attempts to influence judicial interpretation
through many avenues, including increasing women’s influence within the pro-
fession and placing women into judicial positions.536
531 See Leslie W. Gladstone, Women’s Issues in Congress:  Selected Legislation 1832-1998,
in WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ISSUES IN CONGRESS 1832-2000, at 11-106 (Janet V. Lewis ed.,
2001), for a list and description of federal laws that granted women rights through the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.
532 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (finding that denial of
housing and medical benefits to the families of female military officers was an equal protec-
tion violation); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (finding that a statute that required a
preference for a male administrator for a decedent’s estate was an equal protection viola-
tion); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a
Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 263, 267-68 (1997).
533 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (applying a stronger “skeptical
scrutiny” standard); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(noting the majority introduced intermediate scrutiny as a midpoint between strict scrutiny
and a rational basis standard); Mayeri, supra note 528, at 827-34 (arguing the feminist strat-
egy to use the Equal Protection Clause to secure equality and the Court’s interpretation of
that clause limited the content of the equality); see also Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest:
Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297,
297-307 (2001) (arguing that although the ERA was never ratified, the amendment, nonethe-
less, influenced the judges to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in a frame of formal
equality rather than a substantive one).
534 Mayeri, supra note 528, at 759.
535 See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY:  THE RHETO-
RIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:  A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Leslie Bender, Is
Tort Law Male?:  Foreseeability Analysis and Property Managers’ Liability for Third Party
Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993); Sarah E. Burns, Is the Law Male?:
The Role of Experts, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 389 (1993); Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennes-
sey, Is the Law Male?:  The Case of Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345 (1993); Doro-
thy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993);
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male?:  Let Me Count the Ways, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
397 (1993); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male?, TRIAL, Aug. 1995, at 18, 18-20.
536 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 495, at 31-33 (celebrating NAWL efforts in the second half
of the twentieth century to promote women lawyers to the bench and celebrating NAWL
efforts at increasing the role of women lawyers in the ABA ).
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B. Legacy of Women Lawyers Professional Advancement Campaigns
Throughout the twentieth century, women lawyers continued nineteenth-
century efforts to advance women’s stature within the legal profession.
Although they were able to found their own organizations, they nonetheless
worked to infiltrate male professional associations as well as the judiciary.537
From the movement’s beginnings, the goal was to transform systems of govern-
ance to operate on a principle of equality, not to establish separate women’s
systems.538  Activist men were, and remained, critical members of the coali-
tion, but the women members believed they needed to be insiders themselves to
advance their agenda.539  Women therefore worked to increase their standing
within the bar and to win election to judicial and political seats.540
During the first decades of the twentieth century, women lawyers
employed several tactics to work their way inside.  First, they continued the
nineteenth-century strategy of information politics.  For example, Bessie
Bradwell Helmer took over for her mother’s business and continued to edit and
publish the Chicago Legal News until 1925.541  In the mid-1930s, Grace Harte,
a leader within the WBAI, began writing a weekly column in the Chicago
Daily Law Bulletin, the primary legal newspaper of the Chicago bar, on
women’s legal issues and the activities of the WBAI.542  Women lawyers also
attempted to join the mainstream, male bar associations as individuals and
collectively.543
At both the local and national level, these associations discriminated in
their membership, either in rules or in practice, based on sex, race, religion, and
ethnicity.  Although neither the Chicago Bar Association nor the American Bar
Association ever explicitly excluded women from its membership, in practice,
each only admitted small numbers of women through the first half of the twen-
tieth century and each relegated those to the periphery.544  The ABA House of
Delegates was comprised of state and local bar associations but excluded
women’s bar associations.545  The WBAI fought for and finally won a seat in
the ABA’s House of Delegates during World War II.546  But the male strangle-
537 See id.
538 See Harte, supra note 159, at 141; see also The XIV Amendment and Our Case, supra
note 200.
539 EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 247 (arguing that legal professional associations are critical to
the operation and direction of the legal profession).
540 See MORELLO, supra note 41, at 194-217 (describing women lawyers’ efforts to estab-
lish themselves within major law firms); id. at 218-47 (describing women lawyers’ efforts to
win judicial positions).
541 See Thomas, supra note 44, at 225.
542 75 YEAR HISTORY, supra note 497, at 86.
543 See Derry, supra note 500, at 23-24; Highlights of the Year 1942-43, in 75 YEAR HIS-
TORY, supra note 497, at 108, 108.
544 See EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 248 (asserting that the ABA admitted three black men by
mistake in 1912 and subsequently changed the rules to exclude all blacks until the 1940s);
Beatrice A. Clephane, Women Have Won Recognition in the American Bar Association:
With Statistics to Prove It, 25 WOMEN LAW. J. 57 (1939).
545 See Highlights of the Year 1942-43, supra note 543, at 108.
546 See Derry, supra note 500, at 23; Highlights of the Year 1942-43, supra note 543, at
108.
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hold on the ABA was commanding, and women did not gain significant power
in the association until the 1980s.
In 1986, law activists persuaded the ABA House of Delegates to adopt the
goal:  “To Promote Full and Equal Participation in the Profession by Minorities
and Women.”547  The following year, it created the ABA Commission on
Women in the Profession with a mission to “assess the status of women in the
legal profession, identify barriers to advancement, and recommend to the ABA
actions to address problems identified.”548  Hillary Rodham Clinton served as
its first chair and immediately launched a study on the status of women law-
yers.549  The investigation found that “although women have made significant
advancements in gaining access to the practice of law . . . opportunities in the
legal profession remain less available to women, at all levels, than to their male
colleagues.”550
The Commission report sparked a number of state and local bar associa-
tions to conduct their own studies of women’s status in the profession.551  Most
found similar incidents of discrimination.552  Bar associations passed a flurry of
initiatives and resolutions that alleviated most of the overt discrimination
women lawyers and law students had reported, but subsequent studies in 1995
and 2003 found that insidious forms of discrimination remained for all women,
and particularly for women of color.553  These reports acknowledged there had
been “incremental progress,” but noted that barriers to women’s equality, “rein-
forced by entrenched attitudes[,]” persisted.554  Their findings imply what radi-
cal feminists and some legal scholars have suggested, that neither law reforms
nor time will secure women’s substantive equality.555
Law activists’ efforts to infiltrate the judiciary followed a similar path.
Initially, isolated victories occurred.556  In Illinois, for example, Catharine
Waugh McCulloch was elected Justice of the Peace in Evanston (1907-1913)
and appointed master in chancery in the Cook County Superior Court (1917-
1925).557  In 1923, Mary Bartelme was the first woman elected to the Circuit
Court of Cook County.558  Florence Allen accomplished two firsts.  In 1922, in
547 Smith, supra note 495, at 32.
548 ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, COMMISSION BROCHURE 2 (2008-2009);
http://www.abanet.org/women/CWP_brochure_2008-09.pdf.
549 See id.
550 ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2
(1988).
551 See, e.g., Norma J. Wikler, Water on Stone:  A Perspective on the Movement to Elimi-
nate Gender Bias in the Courts, CT. REV., Fall 1989, at 6, 6.
552 See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction:  Gender Bias in the Courts and
Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2143 (1993).
553 See ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:  OVERCOM-
ING THE SISYPHUS FACTOR (1995); see also ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION,
CHARTING OUR PROGRESS:  THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 4 (2006).
554 CHARTING OUR PROGRESS, supra note 553, at 4.
555 See supra note 15.
556 See Larry Berkson, Women on the Bench:  A Brief History, 65 JUDICATURE 286, 287,
290-92 (1982).
557 Linehan, supra note 482, at 561-62.
558 Gwen Hoerr McNamee, Bartelme, Mary Margaret, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO,
supra note 44, at 66, 68.
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Ohio, she became the first woman elected to a state supreme court.559  In 1934,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed her to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, where she became the first woman judge sitting in a federal court of
appeals.560  Forty-seven years later, President Ronald Reagan appointed Sandra
Day O’Connor as the first woman Supreme Court Justice.561
In each of these elections and appointments, law activists used their net-
works to support women candidates.562  Each victory was celebrated as a sig-
nificant advance, and law activists believed that these changes in the face of the
judiciary would lead to a fundamental transformation in the legal systems.563
But, at the end of the twentieth century, although more women had entered the
judiciary, and even as a second woman had been appointed to the United States
Supreme Court,564 the transformation had not occurred.565  Law activists’ net-
works, nonetheless, continued to flourish, locally, nationally, and
internationally.566
C. Legacy of Campaigns through NGOs
From the first international meeting of women’s rights activists in 1888
through the twenty-first century, women lawyers have attempted to use NGOs
to advance their law reform strategy.  Twentieth-century law activists adapted
and employed the model established by the nineteenth-century activists:  expos-
ing and disseminating information on the legal wrongs affecting women; moti-
vating governments to act to correct the legal wrongs to women; and expanding
the ways that women could participate in governance.567  The International
Council of Women held quinquennial meetings through the first half of the
twentieth century.568  Its Committee on Laws regarding the Legal Position of
Women consistently collected and publicized information on women’s legal
559 MORELLO, supra note 41, at 234.
560 DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW, supra note 42, at 207.
561 See Gil Troy, Why Ronald Reagan Picked Sandra Day O’Connor—And Why George W.
Bush Might Want to Follow His Example, HNN, July 1, 2005,  http://hnn.us/articles/
12821.html (arguing that Reagan appointed O’Connor because, although she supported the
ERA, she was not an activist).
562 See Beverly Blair Cook, Allen, Florence Ellinwood, in NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN:
THE MODERN PERIOD 11, 12 (Barbara Sicherman et al. eds., 1980); McNamee, supra note
558, at 68.
563 See Barbara Palmer, “To Do Justly”:  The Integration of Women into the American
Judiciary, 34 PS:  POL. SCI. & POL. 235, 237 (2001) (arguing that their research consistently
shows that “female judges tend to be the strongest supporters of women’s rights claims,
regardless of their ideology”).
564 President Bill Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court in 1993.
See The Supreme Court Historical Soc’y, Timeline of the Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http:/
/www.supremecourthistory.org/history/supremecourthistory_history_current_ginsburg (last
visited June 26, 2009).
565 See REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 550, at 6; see also CHARTING
OUR PROGRESS, supra note 553, at 5.
566 See infra Part IV.C.
567 See generally KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 47, at 16-18, 39-41.
568 See WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 410, at 349 app. 10 (listing the ICW
meetings from 1888 to 1963).  From 1888 to 1934, the ICW met roughly every five years.
From 1936 to 1963, it met just about every three years, except during World War II.  The
ICW suspended meetings after 1938 until 1947.
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inequality and advocated laws and policies that would advance women’s posi-
tion on a wide range of issues, including:  “affiliation orders for illegitimate
children; women’s right of guardianship; marriage and divorce laws; the
removal of sex disqualification; [and] the payment of alimony when the debtor
had left the country.”569  Law activists supplemented these activities with law
reform efforts through international bar associations and government
institutions.570
The first of these activities began in the interwar years.  In 1938, Dorothy
Kenyon, a New York City attorney, became the United States representative to
the League of Nations Committee for the Study of the Status of Women.571
She was one of seven lawyers, from as many nations, responsible for studying
women’s legal status internationally.572  World War II made completion of
their work impossible, but after the War, law activists continued their efforts
through a number of other organizations.  NAWL became members of both the
Inter-American Bar Association and the International Association of Women
Lawyers.573  In 1946, NAWL and ICW participated in the establishment of the
United Nations and debates over the content of its charter, which ultimately
included a resolution to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion[.]”574  They also supported Kenyon as the United States delegate to
the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1946.575
The establishment of the CSW was controversial however.  Some
women’s rights activists believed that women’s issues should not be separated,
but should instead be addressed by the commission on Human Rights, since
women were human beings.576  They explained, “segregation was the one thing
which women had always fought against (whether in the kitchen, in purdah or
behind the veil).”577  Proponents of a special commission for women’s issues
didn’t disagree, but asserted that the disabilities women faced were “so varied,
subtle, and complex” that they required special consideration or they risked
being overlooked.578  Kenyon understood both sides of the debate and prom-
ised “to develop a program of work and recommendations calculated to make
women’s rights come alive.”579
569 See id. at 178-81.
570 See infra notes 571-79.
571 See Susan M. Hartmann, Kenyon, Dorothy, in NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN:  THE MOD-
ERN PERIOD, supra note 562, at 395, 396.
572 See id.
573 See Derry, supra note 500, at 23-24.
574 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.; see also RUPP, supra note 401, at 222-23.
575 See WOMEN IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 410, at 179 (documenting the ICW’s
commitment to the CSW); Smith, supra note 495, at 24 (describing Kenyon’s appointment
to the CSW as evidence of NAWL’s commitment to women throughout the world).
576 See Dorothy Kenyon, United Nations Commission on Status of Women, 33 WOMEN
LAW. J. 37, 38 (1947).
577 Id.
578 Id.
579 Id. at 39-40, 43 (arguing that the CSW committee went beyond the League of Nations’
work as it investigated not just the laws that affected women, but also the ways the laws
were applied and the influence of custom).
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Kenyon sat on the CSW for four years (1946-1950) and attempted to use
her position to advance the argument that women’s issues were human
issues.580  Kenyon was a committed law activist who believed, like the foun-
ders of the women’s rights movement, that “women are people, that they are
human beings with human rights like every other human being[.]”581  She used
the CSW as an investigative tool, adapting the strategy of information politics.
The Commission gathered information from every member nation on the laws
and customs that affected women’s interests and on the way those laws and
customs were applied.582  She also used the CSW as a “watchdog” of other
United Nations (U.N.) commissions, to ensure that they were including
women’s interests as human interests.583  She explained:
We are, if you like, the spark plug of women’s interests everywhere.  Thus, and thus
only, can we make sure that women will not be discriminated against, that they will
be given full opportunity to participate in the work of the world and that they will
never again be segregated.584
For the rest of the twentieth century, women’s rights and law activists
from around the globe worked through the CSW to advance women’s equality
and women’s rights.585  Their primary strategies included information politics
and law reforms.  For fifteen years, the CSW gathered and disseminated infor-
mation on the political and legal status of women and drafted international laws
to advance women’s rights.586  In 1952, the General Assembly adopted the first
of these laws, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, which estab-
lished and protected women’s equal political rights, including the right to vote
and hold office.587  During the 1950s and 1960s, the CSW also secured a num-
ber of laws to end women’s discrimination and protect their rights in marriage
and in the workplace.588  Their efforts culminated in 1979 with the adoption of
the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), which some describe this as the “international women’s
bill of rights.”589
580 See Hartmann, supra note 571, at 396.
581 Kenyon, supra note 576, at 38.
582 See id. at 40-42 (describing the information was gathered from studies and reports con-
ducted by member countries on the legal status of women in their countries and a plan for
regional conferences conducted by the Commission).
583 See id. at 43.
584 Id.
585 See Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/CSW60YRS/CSWbriefhistory.pdf (last visited June 26, 2009).  The U.N.
Commission on Human Rights initially established the CSW as a sub-commission. Id. at 1-
2.  During its first few months, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) granted some
feminists requests to transform the sub-commission to a full commission. Id.  Other femi-
nists opposed, distinguishing and separating women’s issues from general human rights
issues. See RUPP, supra note 401, at 223-24.
586 See Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 585, at 4-5.
587 See id. at 5.
588 See id. at 5-6.
589 Id. at 7-8, 10 (explaining CEDAW began as a Declaration, adopted by the General
Assembly in 1967).  It was elevated to a convention in order to make the measure legally
binding. Id. at 10.
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For the last quarter of the twentieth century, a small group of law activists
once again led the next wave of the international women’s movement.590  They
operated through international committees and the United Nations.591  This
wave began with the International Women’s Year and the first U.N. World
Conference on Women (1975), and was followed by the U.N.’s Decade for
Women (1976-1985) and two more U.N. world conferences (Copenhagen
1980, Nairobi 1985).592  These events focused on strengthening and enforcing
women’s rights through international law, particularly CEDAW.593  Near the
end of the decade, CSW began to focus on ending violence against women and
drafted the Declaration for the Elimination of Violence against Women, which
the General Assembly adopted in 1993.594  CSW continued to employ law
reform as a strategy, but reframed the issues as human rights, rather than
women’s rights.595
The decision to characterize women’s rights as human rights was once
again controversial.  Opponents, primarily feminist law professors, asserted,
like their predecessors, that this decision would misguidedly shift the focus
from complex power inequalities to a simplified goal of possessive individual-
ism.596  Proponents argued that casting women’s rights as human rights
exposed harms that were otherwise unseen or dismissed when perceived as
issues only affecting women.597  This time, those in favor of the human rights
strategy prevailed. They espoused the theory at three successive conferences:
(1) in Toronto (1992), “Linking Hands for Changing Laws – Women’s Rights
as Human Rights Around the World;” (2) in Vienna as part of the Conference
on Human Rights (1993); and (3) in Beijing (1995).598  The primary focus of
these meetings was once again to develop strategies to effect reforms in
590 See A. Riles, The Virtual Sociality of Rights:  The Case of ‘Women’s Rights are Human
Rights’, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 420, 422, 425 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002)
(arguing that the group included Charlotte Bunch, Director of the Center for Global
Women’s Leadership, Anne Walker, Director of International Tribune Center, and Bella
Abzug, President of Women’s Environment and Development Organization). See also
RUPP, supra note 401, at 224-25; Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women,
supra note 585, at 9 –12.
591 See Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 585, at 9.
592 See id. at 8-9, 11-12.
593 See id. at 9-13.
594 See id. at 13-14.
595 See id. at 13-15.
596 See Riles, supra note 590, at 420-35.
597 Charlotte Bunch, Organizing for Women’s Human Rights Globally, in OURS BY RIGHT:
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 141, 141-149 (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993). See also Char-
lotte Bunch, Samantha Frost & Niamh Reilly, Making the Global Local:  International
Networking for Women’s Rights, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 91,
91-113 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999).
598 See Joanna Kerr, The Context and the Goal, in OURS BY RIGHT, supra note 597, at 3, 6-
8 (describing the presentation of the argument that women’s rights are human rights at the
“Linking Hands” conference in Toronto, Canada in 1992); see also Arvonne S. Fraser,
Becoming Human:  The Origins and Development of Women’s Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS.
Q. 853, 903-04 (1999) (arguing that women’s rights as human rights was prominent theme at
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and at the 1995 UN World Confer-
ence on Women in Beijing).
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women’s rights across the globe.599  They sought to make “governments—their
laws, policies and actions—accountable to women.”600  The activists acknowl-
edged that they had to create laws to establish women’s rights, to ensure that
the laws were interpreted and enforced, and they also recognized the work of
“feminist lawyers” in pursuing those ends.601
Hilary Rodham Clinton’s address to the Women’s Plenary Session in Beij-
ing was the capstone of the campaign.602  She asked the transnational advocacy
network of women and human rights activists to continue in the effort to secure
social, civil, and political rights for women.603  She emphasized women’s need
for “access to education, health care, jobs and credit [and] the chance [for
women] to enjoy basic legal and human rights and to participate fully in the
political life of” their country.604  She further acknowledged the network’s
power, through activities including the conference, to “compel governments
and peoples everywhere to listen, look and face the world’s most pressing
problems . . . and to give voice to women everywhere whose experiences go
unnoticed, whose words go unheard.”605  At the end of the conference, the
CSW enacted the Beijing Declaration and a Platform for Action, which incor-
porated its previous law reforms and determined to establish women’s legal and
substantive equality.606
The women’s rights campaigns of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
have yielded limited, incremental rights for women in the United States and
many countries throughout the world but have still failed to secure women’s
substantive equality.  Women’s rights activists have always been aware of the
limitations of their results of their campaigns, but have persisted, maintaining a
core belief in their liberating power.  As early as 1906, Catharine Waugh
McCulloch acknowledged both that “the horrified protests of thousands of
wronged women have gradually brought some changes in [the] law,” and that
“they are not sufficiently far reaching.”607  The contrast is exemplified in the
2007 presidential campaign of Hilary Rodham Clinton.  A lawyer, senator, and
presidential candidate, she represented the gains of the women’s rights move-
ment.  But her 1995 speech and her twenty-first-century agenda exposed the
legal inequalities that continue.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the nineteenth century, a component of the women’s rights
movement implemented a strategy of law reform to secure women’s legal
equality.  This faction was connected yet distinguishable from other factions
599 See Kerr, supra note 598, at 6.
600 Id.
601 Id.
602 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Women’s Rights are Human Rights (Sept. 5, 1995) (transcript
available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/Hillary%20Clinton%20-
%20Womens%20Rights.pdf).
603 Id. at 3-5.
604 Id. at 1.
605 Id. at 2.
606 See Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 585, at 15.
607 MCCULLOCH, supra note 382, at 5.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ303.txt unknown Seq: 65 13-OCT-09 11:53
644 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:580
within the movement, because its leaders maintained a democratic vision of
society based on principles of liberty and equality.  The faction emerged in the
years after the Civil War, as the leaders of the antebellum movement divided
over issues of principle and strategy.  It was led by a cadre of women lawyers
who attempted to use the law to abolish the extant status regime and replace it
with a system of individual rights.  They believed that such a system would
secure women’s substantive equality.
The law activists operated from two positions in their campaigns to win
women’s legal equality.  They worked within the dominant systems of govern-
ance, where they created new forms of legal reasoning to influence the enact-
ment, interpretation, and enforcement of positive laws.  Simultaneously, they
worked within nongovernmental organizations where they created new meth-
ods of information politics to influence legal and political institutions.  Their
efforts secured civil and political rights for women incrementally.608  They also
formed the basis of the law reform movement that continued through the twen-
tieth century.
The campaigns to secure women’s legal equality endured for two centu-
ries. They were most effective when large social movements supported
them.609  But, even in periods where there was little outside support, a small
group of law activists steadfastly implemented law reform strategies.  The law
activists believed that securing women’s legal equality was the most effective
means to securing women’s substantive equality, but they understood that it
mattered how the law was changed.  Beginning in the late nineteenth century
and through the twentieth century, law activists increasingly debated how to
shape laws and influence judicial interpretation in a system that maintained
differences based on status.610  They understood that establishing formal equal-
ity in a system that maintained race and gender hierarchies would not, alone,
result in substantive equality.611  They also understood that law reforms that
accommodated status differences offered relief at the price of perpetuating the
status hierarchy.  Yet as they balanced the costs and benefits of each approach
and worked toward an accord, they nonetheless continued their law reform
strategy.
Each generation faced unique and particular circumstances that influenced
the way they conceptualized and addressed women’s inequality, but there were
continuities in both the actors and the strategies.  The leaders of each preceding
generation mentored the leaders of the next, who then continued the unfinished
campaigns.  The 1870s New Departure arguments and the law reform move-
ment that followed formed the roots of the 1970s arguments for a judicial rein-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Those efforts and their
608 See MCCULLOCH, supra note 483, at 1-4. (listing the law reform advances in Illinois
1855 to 1913).
609 See HARRISON, supra note 511, at xii (arguing that in the two decades after World War
II, a small group of women’s rights activists laid the foundation for the second wave of
feminism and the policy changes enacted in the late 1960s that enhanced women’s rights).
610 See Mayeri, supra note 528, at 757 (arguing that in the 1960s and 1970s legal feminists
debated and then united over a dual strategy of constitutional amendment and reinterpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure sex equality).
611 See, e.g., MCCULLOCH, supra note 382, at 5 (arguing that the law reforms secured for
women did not in practice secure women’s legal equality).
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consequences now influence the strategies of law activists in the twenty-first
century.  Similarly, the transnational advocacy network’s law reform cam-
paigns of 1890s established the foundation of the United Nations women’s
international rights campaigns of the 1980s and beyond.  The movement’s aim
to achieve women’s legal equality persists, but substantive equality remains
elusive.612  By the end of the twentieth century the women’s local and national
efforts neared a formal, legal equality, and they affected important advances in
women’s international right.  But significant substantive inequalities
remained.613
The dissonance between formal equality and substantive equality lies at
the root of American law and American society.  Changes in legal statutes, and
even constitutional provisions, have transformed but not abolished the systems’
underlying status regime.  Rather, the legal system has adapted to and manipu-
lated those changes in order to maintain the status regime.  The history of the
law reform movement calls into question whether the continued application of
the law reform strategy will ever secure substantive equality.  If the answer is
no, then law activists must ask whether they should abandon the goal, or imple-
ment alternative, radical strategies.
612 See Mayeri, supra note 528, at 758-60.
613 See Becker, supra note 17, at 253 (listing among women’s inequalities: the wage gap,
sex-segregated jobs, the second-shift, domestic violence, sexual abuse, credibility, religious
and sports participation, and political office); see also Mayeri, supra note 528, at 757-58.
